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The paper proposes a novel analysis of quantiﬁcational subordination, e.g., Harvey
courts a woman at every convention. She is very pretty.vs.
She always comes to the banquet with him.— in particular of the fact
that the indeﬁnite in the initial sentence can have wide or narrow scope, but the ﬁrst
discourse as a whole allows only for the wide scope reading, while the second discourse
allows for both readings. The cross-sentential interaction between scope and anaphora
is captured in terms of structured anaphora to quantiﬁer domains, formalized in a new
dynamic system couched in classical type logic that builds on the Dynamic Plural Logic
of van den Berg [9]. Given the underlying type logic, compositionality at sub-clausal level
follows automatically. Modal subordination is analyzed in a parallel way, thereby capturing
the parallels between the individual and modal domains repeatedly argued for in the
literature. We also outline the analysis of several other phenomena in terms of structured
anaphora: exceptional scope, weak/strong donkey readings, anaphoric/uniqueness-
implying deﬁnite descriptions and interactions between same/different and
quantiﬁer scope.
© 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction: quantiﬁcational subordination
The present paper proposes a novel account of the contrast between the interpretations of the discourses in (1) and (2)
below based on Karttunen [42] (the superscripts and subscripts indicate the antecedent–anaphor relations).
(1) a. Harvey courts au woman at every convention.
b. Sheu is very pretty.
(2) a. Harvey courts au woman at every convention.
b. Sheu always comes to the banquet with him.
c. Theu woman is usually also very pretty.
Sentence (1a/2a) by itself is ambiguous between two quantiﬁer scopings: it “can mean that, at every convention, there is
some woman that Harvey courts or that there is some woman that Harvey courts at every convention. […] Harvey always
courts the same [woman] […] [or] it may be a different [woman] each time” [42, p. 377]. The contrast between (1b) and (2b)
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is that the former allows only for the ‘same woman’ reading of sentence (1a/2a), while the latter is also compatible with the
‘possibly different women’ reading.
Discourse (1) raises the following question: how can we capture the fact that a singular anaphoric pronoun in sentence
(1b) can interact with and disambiguate quantiﬁer scopings1 in sentence (1a)? That number morphology on the pronoun
sheu is crucial is shown by the discourse in (3) below, where the (preferred) relative scoping of every convention
and au woman is the opposite of the one in discourse (1).
(3) a. Harvey courts au woman at every convention.
b. Theyu are very pretty.
Discourse (2) raises the followingquestions. First,why is it thataddinganadverbofquantiﬁcation, i.e.,always/usually ,
makes both readings of sentence (2a) available? Moreover, on the newly available reading of sentence (2a), i.e., the every
convention>>au woman scoping, how can we capture the intuition that the singular pronoun sheu and the adverb
always in sentence (2b) elaborate on the quantiﬁcational dependency between conventions and women introduced in
sentence (2a), i.e., how can we capture the intuition that we seem to have simultaneous anaphora to the two quantiﬁer
domains and to the quantiﬁcational dependency between them?
The phenomenon instantiated by discourses (1) and (2) is subsumed under themore general label of quantiﬁcational sub-
ordination (see [37, p. 139, (2)]), which covers a variety of phenomena involving interactions between generalized quantiﬁers
and morphologically singular cross-sentential anaphora.
The main goal of this paper is give an account of quantiﬁcational subordination couched within a new compositional
dynamic systemwhich straightforwardly generalizes to an account ofmodal subordination, thereby capturing the anaphoric
and quantiﬁcational parallels between the individual and modal domains argued for in Frank [27], Geurts [30], Stone [77],
Bittner [10] and Schlenker [72] among others (building on Partee [56,57]). The same system accounts for a variety of em-
pirically unrelated phenomena: exceptional scope indeﬁnites, weak vs. strong donkey readings, the (variable nature of the)
uniqueness effects associated with singular anaphora, anaphoric vs. Russellian (i.e., non-anaphoric, uniqueness-implying)
uses of deﬁnite descriptions and the interaction between the adjectives same and different and quantiﬁer scope.
2. Plural compositional DRT (PCDRT)
This section introduces the semantic framework in which the analysis of discourses (1) and (2) is couched. The main
proposal is that (compositionally) assigning natural language expressions ﬁner-grained semantic values (compared to the
meanings assigned in static Montague semantics) enables us to capture the interaction between generalized quantiﬁers,
singular pronouns and adverbs of quantiﬁcation exhibited by the contrast between (1) and (2).
Accounting for cross-sentential phenomena in semantic terms (as opposed to purely/primarily pragmatic terms) requires
some preliminary justiﬁcation. First, the same kind of ﬁner-grained semantic values (to be introduced presently) are inde-
pendently motivated by intra-sentential phenomena – see the account of exceptional scope, mixed weak and strong donkey
sentences and sentence-internal readings of same/different in Section 4 below.
Second, the phenomenon instantiated by (1) and (2) is as much intra-sentential (hence part of the recursive deﬁnition of
truth and satisfaction, i.e., a semanticmatter) as it is cross-sentential: there are four separate components that come together
to yield the contrast in interpretation between (1) and (2), namely (i) the generalized quantiﬁerevery convention, (ii)
the indeﬁnite au woman, (iii) the singular number morphology on the pronoun sheu and (iv) the adverb of quantiﬁcation
always/usually . To derive the intuitively correct interpretations for (1) and (2), we have to attend to both the cross-
sentential connections au woman – sheu and every convention – always/usually and the intra-sentential
interactions every convention – au woman and always – sheu.
I conclude that an account of the contrast between (1) and (2) that involves a revamping of semantic values has sufﬁcient
initial plausibility tomake its pursuit worthwhile. To this end, I introduce a new dynamic system couched in classical (many-
sorted) type logic which, building on the Dynamic Plural Logic of van den Berg [9], extends Compositional DRT (CDRT, [52])
in two ways: (i) with plural information states and (ii) with selective generalized quantiﬁcation. The resulting system is
dubbed Plural CDRT (PCDRT).
2.1. The basic account: plural information states and structured anaphora
The main technical innovation relative to CDRT is that, just as in Dynamic Plural Logic [9], information states I, J, . . . are
modeled as sets of variable assignments i, j, . . .; such plural info states can be represented as matrices with assignments
(sequences) as rows, as shown below.
1 To see that it is indeed quantiﬁer scopings that are disambiguated, substituteexactly oneu woman for au woman in (1a); this yields two truth-
conditionally independent scopings: (i) exactly oneu woman>>every convention, which is true in a situation in which Harvey courts more
than one woman per convention, but there is exactly one (e.g., Faye Dunaway) that he never fails to court, and (ii) every convention>>exactly
oneu woman.
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Info state I . . . u u′ . . .
i1 . . . α1 (i.e., ui1) β1 (i.e., u
′i1) . . .
i2 . . . α2 (i.e., ui2) β2 (i.e., u
′i2) . . .
i3 . . . α3 (i.e., ui3) β3 (i.e., u
′i3) . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Quantiﬁer domains (sets) are stored
columnwise: {α1, α2, α3, . . .}, {β1, β2,
β3, . . .}
Quantiﬁer dependencies (relations) are stored row-
wise: {〈α1,β1〉, 〈α2,β2〉, 〈α3,β3〉, . . .}
Plural info states enable us to encode discourse reference to both quantiﬁer domains, i.e., values, and quantiﬁcational
dependencies, i.e., structure. The values are the sets of objects that are stored in the columns of the matrix, e.g., a discourse
referent (dref) u for individuals stores a set of individuals {α1,α2,α3, . . .} relative to a plural info state given that u is assigned
an individual by each assignment/row. The structure is encoded in the rows of the matrix: for each assignment/row in the
info state, the individual assigned to a dref u by that assignment is correlated with the individual assigned to some other
dref u′ by the same assignment.
Thus, plural info states enable us to pass information about both quantiﬁer domains and quantiﬁcational dependencies
across sentential/clausal boundaries, which is exactly what we need to account for the interpretation of discourses (1) and
(2). More precisely, we need the following two ingredients.
First, we need a suitable meaning for generalized determiners that will store two things in the input plural info state: (i)
the restrictor and nuclear scope sets of individuals that are introduced and related by the determiner; (ii) the quantiﬁcational
dependencies between the individuals in the restrictor/nuclear scope set and any other quantiﬁers/indeﬁnites in the restric-
tor/nuclear scope of the quantiﬁcation, e.g., between every convention in (1a/2a) and the indeﬁnite au woman in
its nuclear scope. Given that plural info states store both sets of individuals and dependencies between them, both kinds of
information are available for subsequent anaphoric retrieval; for example, always and sheu in (2b) are simultaneously
anaphoric to both the sets of conventions and women and the dependency between these sets introduced in (2a).
The second ingredient is a suitable meaning for singular number morphology on pronouns like sheu in (1b) and (2b)
above. This meaning has to derive the observed interactions between (i) singular pronouns, (ii) quantiﬁers and indeﬁnites in
the previous discourse, e.g., every convention and au woman in (1a/2a), and (iii) quantiﬁers in the same sentence,
e.g., the adverb always in (2b). In particular, I will take singular number morphology on sheu to require the set of u-
individuals stored by the current plural info state to be a singleton. The set of u-individuals is introduced by the indeﬁniteau
woman and is available for anaphoric retrieval irrespective of whether the indeﬁnite has wide or narrow scope in sentence
(1a/2a). Thus, plural info states are yet again crucial for the analysis: they enable us to store and pass on structured sets of
individuals, so that we can constrain their cardinality by subsequent, syntactically non-local anaphoric elements.
If the indeﬁniteau womanhasnarrowscope relative toevery convention, the singleton requirement contributed
by sheu applies to the set of all women that are courted by Harvey at some convention or other. Requiring this set to be a
singleton boils down to discarding all the plural info states that would satisfy the narrow-scope indeﬁnite reading every
convention>>au woman, but not the wide-scope reading au woman>>every convention. We therefore
derive the intuition that, irrespective of which quantiﬁer scoping we assume for sentence (1a), any plural info state that we
obtain after a successful update with sentence (1b) is bound to satisfy the reading in which the indeﬁnite au woman (or a
quantiﬁer like exactly oneu woman) takes wide scope.
In discourse (2), however, the adverb of quantiﬁcation always in (2b), which is anaphoric to the nuclear scope set
introduced byevery convention in (2a), can take scope either belowor above the singular pronounsheu. If always
takes scope below sheu, we obtain the same reading as in discourse (1). But if always takes scope above sheu, it ‘breaks’
the input plural info state, which stores all the conventions, into smaller sub-states, each storing a particular convention.
Consequently, the singleton requirement contributed by sheu is enforced locally, relative to each of these sub-states, and
not globally, relative to the whole input info state, and we end up requiring the courted woman to be unique per convention
and not across the board.
The remainder of this section presents the basics of the compositional dynamic system, while Section 3 introduces the
meanings for selective generalized determiners, indeﬁnites and singular/plural pronouns.
2.2. DRSs and conditions
Weworkwith a Dynamic Ty2 logic, i.e., with the Logic of Change inMuskens [52], which reformulates dynamic semantics
[36,38] in Gallin’s Ty2 [28]. We have three basic types: type t (truth-values), type e (individuals; variables: x, x′, etc.) and
type s (‘variable assignments’; variables: i, j, etc.). A suitable set of axioms ensures that the entities of type s do behave as
variable assignments.2
A dref for individuals u is a function of type se from assignments is to individuals xe (subscripts on terms indicate their
type). Intuitively, the individual useis is the individual that the assignment i assigns to the dref u. Dynamic info states I, J, etc.
2 See [52] for more details.
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are plural: they are sets of variable assignments, i.e., terms of type st. An individual dref u stores a set of individuals with
respect to a plural info state I, abbreviated as uI
def= {useis : is ∈ Ist}, i.e., uI is the image of the set of assignments I under the
function u.
A sentence is interpreted as a Discourse Representation Structure (DRS), which is a relation of type (st)((st)t) between
an input state Ist and an output state Jst , as shown in (4) below. A DRS requires: (i) the input info state I to differ from the
output state J at most with respect to the new drefs and (ii) all the conditions to be satisﬁed relative to the output state J.
The deﬁnition of dref introduction (a.k.a. random assignment) is given in (5) below.3,4
(4) [new drefs | conditions] def= λIst .λJst . I[new drefs]J ∧ conditions J
(5) [u] def= λIst .λJst . ∀is ∈ I(∃js ∈ J(i[u]j)) ∧ ∀js ∈ J(∃is ∈ I(i[u]j))
(6) [conditions] def= λIst .λJst . I = J ∧ conditions J
For example, [u1, u2 |woman{u1}, convention{u2}, courted_at{u1, u2}] is the DRS-style abbreviation of the Ty2 term
λIst .λJst . I[u1, u2]J ∧ woman{u1}J ∧ convention{u2}J ∧ courted_at{u1, u2}J. DRSs of the form shown in (6) above are tests
– for example, [woman{u1}] def= λIst .λJst . I = J ∧ woman{u1}J tests that the input state I satisﬁes the condition woman{u1}.
Conditions denote sets of info states, i.e., they are terms of type (st)t, and they are interpreted distributively relative to
a plural info state. For example, courted_at{u1, u2} is a dynamic condition based on the static relation between individuals
courted_at (of type e(et)) and the condition is basically the term λIst .I /= ∅ ∧ ∀is ∈ I(courted_at(u1i, u2i)). For the general
deﬁnition of atomic conditions, see Section 3.1 below.
2.3. Compositionality
Given the underlying type logic, compositionality at sub-clausal level follows automatically and standard techniques
from Montague semantics (e.g., type shifting) become available. In more detail, the compositional aspect of interpretation
in an extensional Fregean/Montagovian framework is largely determined by the types for the (extensions of the) ‘saturated’
expressions, i.e., names and sentences. Abbreviate them as e and t. An extensional static logic identiﬁes ewith e and twith
t. The translation of the English noun woman is of type et, i.e., et: womanλxe. womanet(x). The determiner every is of
type (et)((et)t), i.e., (et)((et)t): everyλXet .λX′et . ∀xe(X(x) → X′(x)).
PCDRT assigns the following dynamic types to the ‘meta-types’ e and t: t abbreviates (st)((st)t), i.e., a sentence is inter-
preted as a DRS, and e abbreviates se, i.e., a name is interpreted as a dref. The denotation of the noun woman is still of type
et, as shown in (7) below. Moreover, the determiner every is still of type (et)((et)t) – and its deﬁnition is provided in the
next section.
(7) womanλve. [womanet{v}], i.e., womanλve.λIst .λJst . I = J ∧ womanet{v}J
3. Generalized quantiﬁcation
We turn now to the deﬁnition of selective generalized quantiﬁcation. The deﬁnition has to satisfy four desiderata, the ﬁrst
three of which are about anaphoric connections that can be established internally, within the generalized quantiﬁcation, i.e.,
between antecedents in the restrictor and anaphors in the nuclear scope, and the last of which is about anaphora that can
be established externally, i.e., between antecedents introduced by/within the quantiﬁcation and anaphors that are outside
the quantiﬁcation.
Let us begin with quantiﬁcation-internal anaphora. First, we want our deﬁnition to be able to account for the fact that
anaphoric connections between the restrictor and the nuclear scope of the quantiﬁcation can in fact be established, i.e., we
want to account for donkey anaphora (Everyu farmer who owns au
′ donkey beats itu′ ).
Second, we want to account for such anaphoric connections while avoiding the proportion problem that unselective
quantiﬁcation (in the sense of Lewis [49]) runs into. That is, we need generalized determiners to relate sets of individuals
(i.e., sets of type et) and not sets of assignments (i.e., sets of type st). The sentence Mostu farmers who own au
′
donkey beat itu′ provides a typical instance of the proportion problem: intuitively, this sentence is false in a situation
in which there are 10 farmers, nine have a single donkey each and they do not beat it, while the tenth has 20 donkeys and he
is busy beating them all. The unselective interpretation of the most-quantiﬁcation, however, incorrectly predicts that the
sentence is true in this situation because more than half of the 〈farmer, donkey〉 pairs (20 out of 29) are such that the farmer
beats the donkey.
The third desideratum is that the deﬁnition of selective generalized quantiﬁcation be compatible with both strong and
weak donkey readings: we want to allow for the different interpretations associated with the donkey anaphora in (8) (from
Heim [37]) and (9) (from Pelletier [58]) below. Sentence (8) is interpreted as: most slave-owners were such that, for every
3 See [11] for its justiﬁcation.
4 Multiple dref introduction is deﬁned as usual: [u1 , . . . , un] def= [u1]; . . . ; [un]. See (14) below for the deﬁnition of dynamic conjunction “;”.
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(strong reading) slave they owned, they also owned his offspring. Sentence (9) is interpreted as: every dime-owner puts
some (weak reading) dime of her/his in the meter. For more discussion of weak/strong readings, see Section 4.4.
(8) Mostu people that owned au
′
slave also owned hisu′ offspring.
(9) Everyu person who has au
′
dime will put itu′ in the meter.
The fourth desideratum is concerned with quantiﬁcation-external anaphora – and this brings us back to discourses
(1) and (2). These discourses indicate that we need to make available for subsequent anaphora the restrictor and nuclear
scope sets of individuals related by generalized determiners – and we also need to make available for anaphoric take-up
the quantiﬁcational dependencies between different quantiﬁers and/or indeﬁnites. In particular, generalized quantiﬁcation
supports anaphora to two sets: (i) the maximal set of individuals satisfying the restrictor DRS, i.e., the restrictor set, and (ii)
themaximal set of individuals satisfying the restrictor and nuclear scope DRSs, i.e., the nuclear scope set.5 Note that the latter
set is the nuclear scope that emerges as a consequence of the conservativity of natural language quantiﬁcation – and, as [9]
(among others) observes, we need to build conservativity into the deﬁnition of dynamic quantiﬁcation to account for the
fact that the nuclear scope DRS can contain anaphors dependent on antecedents in the restrictor DRS.
The discourse in (10) below exempliﬁes anaphora to nuclear scope sets. Sentence (10b) is interpreted as: the people that
went to the beach are the students that left the party after 5 a.m. – which, in addition, formed a majority of the students at
the party. The discourses in (11) and (12) exemplify anaphora to the restrictor sets contributed by the downward monotonic
quantiﬁers nou student and very fewu people respectively. Consider (11) ﬁrst: any successful update with a
nou-quantiﬁcation ensures that the nuclear scope set is empty (this is due to the fact that we built conservativity into our
representation of generalized quantiﬁcation) and anaphora to it is therefore infelicitous. The only possible anaphora in (11) is
restrictor set anaphora. Restrictor set anaphora is the only possible one in (12) too, because nuclear scope anaphora yields a
contradictory interpretation for (12b): most of the people with a rich uncle that inherit his fortune do not inherit his fortune.
(10) a. Mostu students left the party after 5 a.m.
b. Theyu went directly to the beach.
(11) a. Nou student left the party later than 10 p.m.
b. Theyu had classes early in the morning.
(12) a. Very fewu people with a rich uncle inherit his fortune.
b. Most of themu don’t.
Thus, selective generalized determiners receive the translation in (13) below, which is in the spirit (but rather far from
the letter) of [9].6
(13) detu,u′u λPet.λP′et. maxu(〈u〉(P(u))); maxu′u(〈u′〉(P′(u′))); [DET{u, u′}]
(14) D;D′ def= λIst .λJst . ∃Hst(DIH ∧ D′HJ),
where D, D′ are DRSs (type t).
As expected,detu,u′u relates a restrictor dynamic property Pet and a nuclear scope dynamic property P′et. When these
dynamic properties are applied to drefs, i.e., P(u) and P′(u′), we obtain a restrictor DRS P(u) and a nuclear scope DRS P′(u′)
of type t. A generalized determiner introduces two individual drefs: u stores the restrictor set and u′ the nuclear scope set.
These two drefs and the two dynamic properties P and P′ are the basic building blocks of the three separate updates in (13).
Theﬁrst update, namelymaxu(〈u〉(P(u))), ensures that the restrictor setu is themaximal set of individuals, i.e.,maxu(. . .),
such that, when we take each u-individual separately, i.e., 〈u〉(. . .), this individual satisﬁes the restrictor dynamic property,
i.e., P(u). The second update, namely maxu
′u(〈u′〉(P′(u′))), ensures that the nuclear scope set u′ is obtained in much the
same way as the restrictor set u, except for the requirement that u′ is the maximal structured subset of u, i.e.,maxu′u(. . .).
Finally, the third update, namely [DET{u, u′}], is a test: we test that the restrictor set u and the nuclear scope set u′ stand
in the relation denoted by the corresponding static determiner DET. The three distinct updates in (13) are conjoined and,
as (14) above shows, dynamic conjunction “;” is interpreted as relation composition. Note the difference between dynamic
conjunction, which is an abbreviation, and the ofﬁcial, classical, static conjunction “∧”.
To formally spell out themeaning for generalizeddeterminers in (13) aboveand themeanings for indeﬁnites andpronouns,
we need: (i) two operators over plural info states, namely a selective maximization operator maxu(. . .) and a selective
distributivity operator 〈u〉(. . .) and (ii) a notion of structured inclusion u′  u that requires the subset to preserve the
quantiﬁcational dependencies, i.e., the structure, associated with the individuals in the superset.
5 Throughout the paper, I will ignore anaphora to complement sets, i.e., sets obtained by taking the complement of the nuclear scope relative to the
restrictor, e.g., Very few students were paying attention in class. They were hungover .
6 Cf. van den Berg [9, p. 149], Deﬁnition (4.1).
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3.1. Structured inclusion
Let us start with the notion of structured inclusion. Recall that plural info states store both values (in the columns of the
matrix) and structure (in the rows of the matrix). Requiring a dref u3 to simply be a value-subset of another dref u1 relative
to an info state I is deﬁned as shown in (15) below. For example, the leftmost u3 column in the table below satisﬁes the
condition u3 ⊆ u1 because u3I = {α1,α2,α3} ⊆ u1I = {α1,α2,α3,α4}.
Condition (15) requires only value inclusion and disregards structure completely. The correlation between the u1- and u2-
individuals, i.e., the relation {〈α1,β1〉 , 〈α2,β2〉 , 〈α3,β3〉 , 〈α4,β4〉}, is lost in going from the u1-superset to the u3-subset:
as far as u3 and u2 are concerned, α1 is still correlated with β1, but it is now also correlated with β3, α2 is now correlated
with β4 (not β2) and α3 with β2 (not β3).
(15) u3 ⊆ u1 def= λIst . u3I ⊆ u1I
(16) u3u1 def= λIst . ∀is ∈ I(u3i = u1i ∨ u3i = #)
Info state I u1 u2 u3 (u3 ⊆ u1, u3 u1) u3 (u3u1)
i1 α1 β1 α1 α1
i2 α2 β2 α3 α2
i3 α3 β3 α1 #
i4 α4 β4 α2 α4
If we use the notion of value-only subset in (15), we make incorrect empirical predictions. Consider, for example, the
discourse in (17) below, where u1 stores the set of conventions
7 and u2 stores the set of corresponding women. Assume
that everyu1 convention takes scope over au2 woman and that the correlation between the u1-conventions and the
courted u2-women is the one represented in the table above. Intuitively, the adverb usually in (17b) is anaphoric to the
set of conventions introduced in (17a) — and (17b) is interpreted as follows: at most conventions, the woman courted by
Harvey at that convention comes to the banquet with him. The leftmost dref u3 in the table above storesmost u1-conventions
(three out of four), but it does not preserve the correlation between u1-conventions and u2-women established in (17a).
(17) a. Harvey courts au2 woman at everyu1 convention.
b. Sheu2 usually
u3⊆u1 comes to the banquet with him.
(18) Mostu1,u3⊆u1 farmers who own au2 donkey beat itu2.
We obtain similarly incorrect results for donkey sentences like the one in (18) above: the restrictor of the quantiﬁcation
introduces a dependency between all the donkey-owning u1-farmers and the u2-donkeys that they own; the nuclear scope
set u3 needs to contain most u1-farmers, but in such a way that the correlated u2-donkeys remain the same. That is, the
nuclear scope set contains a most-subset of donkey-owning farmers that beat their respective donkey(s). The notion of
value-only inclusion in (15) is, yet again, inadequate.
Thus, to capture the intra- and cross-sentential interaction between anaphora and quantiﬁcation, we need the notion of
structured inclusion deﬁned in (16) above, wherebywe go from a superset to a subset by discarding rows in thematrix.We are
therefore guaranteed that the subset will contain only the dependencies associated with the superset (but not necessarily all
dependencies – see below). To formalize this, I follow van den Berg [9] and introduce a dummy/exception individual # that
is used as a tag for the cells in the matrix that should be discarded in order to obtain a structured subset u3 of a superset u1
– as shown by the rightmost u3 column in the table above.
Unlike van den Berg [9], I do not take the introduction of the dummy individual # to require making the underlying
logic partial, i.e., I will not take a lexical relation that has # as one of its arguments, e.g., woman(#) or courted_at(#,α1),
to be undeﬁned. I will just require the dummy individual # to make any lexical relation false.8 This allows us to keep the
underlying type logic classical while making sure that we do not accidentally introduce # and inadvertently discard a cell
whenweevaluate another lexical relation later on. Thus, lexical relations (i.e., atomic conditions) are interpreteddistributively
relative to the non-dummy sub-state of the input plural info state I, as shown in (20) below.
(19) Iu1 /=#,...,un /=#
def= {is ∈ I : u1i /= # ∧ . . . ∧ uni /= #}
(20) R{u1, . . . , un} def= λIst . Iu1 /=#,...,un /=# /= ∅ ∧ ∀is ∈ Iu1 /=#,...,un /=#(R(u1i, . . . , uni))
The notion of structured inclusion in (16) above ensures that the subset inherits only the superset structure – but we
also need it to inherit all the superset structure, which we achieve bymeans of the second conjunct in Deﬁnition (21) below.
This conjunct is needed (among others) to account for the donkey sentence in (8) above, which is interpreted as talking
7 The restrictor and nuclear scope sets of a successful every-quantiﬁcation are identical with respect to both value and structure, so we can safely
conﬂate them.
8 We ensure that any lexical relation R of arity n, i.e., of type ent, deﬁned recursively as in Muskens ([52]: 157–158): e0t
def= t and em+1t def= e(emt), yields
falsity whenever # is one of its arguments by letting R ⊆ (DeM\{#})n .
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about every slave owned by any given person, i.e., the nuclear scope set, which is a most-subset of the restrictor set, needs
to inherit all the superset structure (each slave owner in the nuclear scope set needs to be associated with every slave that
s/he owned).
(21) u′  u def= λIst . (u′u)I ∧ ∀is ∈ I(ui ∈ u′Iu′ /=# → ui = u′i)
3.2. Maximization and distributivity
We turn now to the maximization and distributivity operators maxu and distu, which are deﬁned in the spirit of the
corresponding operators in van den Berg [9]. Selective maximization and selective distributivity together enable us to
dynamize λ-abstraction over both values (i.e., quantiﬁer domains) and structure (i.e., quantiﬁcational dependencies). That
is,maxu and distu enable us to extract and store the restrictor and nuclear scope structured sets needed to deﬁne dynamic
generalized quantiﬁcation.
Consider the deﬁnition ofmaxu in (22) below ﬁrst: the ﬁrst conjunct introduces u as a new dref, i.e., [u], and makes sure
that each individual in uJ satisﬁesD, i.e., we store only individuals that satisfyD. The second conjunct enforces themaximality
requirement: any other set uK obtained by a similar procedure, i.e., any other set of individuals that satisﬁes D, is included
in uJ – that is, uJ stores all individuals that satisfy D.
(22) maxu(D)
def= λIst .λJst . ([u];D)IJ ∧ ∀Kst(([u];D)IK → uKu /=# ⊆ uJu /=#)
(23) maxu
′u(D) def= maxu′([u′  u];D)
(24) Iu=x def= {is ∈ I : ui = x}
(25) distu(D)
def= λIst .λJst . uI = uJ ∧ ∀xe ∈ uI(DIu=xJu=x)
Deﬁnition (25) states that updating an info state I with a DRS D distributively over a dref u means: (i) generating the
u-partition of I, i.e., {Iu=x : x ∈ uI}, (ii) updating each cell Iu=x in the partition with the DRS D and (iii) taking the union of
the resulting output info states. The ﬁrst conjunct in (25) is required to ensure that there is a bijection between the partition
induced by the dref u over the input state I and the one induced over the output state J; without this requirement, we could
introduce arbitrary new values for u in the output state J, i.e., arbitrary new partition cells.9 The second conjunct is the one
that actually deﬁnes the distributive update: the DRS D relates every partition cell in the input state I to the corresponding
partition cell in the output state J.
3.3. Generalized quantiﬁers and indeﬁnites
The meanings for generalized determiners and weak/strong indeﬁnites are provided in (29), (30) and (31) below.10
(26) u(D)
def= λIst .λJst . Iu=# = Ju=# ∧ Iu /=# /= ∅ ∧ distu(D)Iu /=#Ju /=#
(27) 〈u〉(D) def= λIst .λJst . Iu=# = Ju=# ∧ (Iu /=# = ∅ → I = J) ∧ (Iu /=# /= ∅ → distu(D)Iu /=#Ju /=#)
(28) DET{u, u′} def= λIst . DET(uIu /=#, u′Iu′ /=#),
where DET is a static determiner.
(29) detu,u′u λPet.λP′et. maxu(〈u〉(P(u))); maxu′u(〈u′〉(P′(u′))); [DET{u, u′}]
(30) awk:uλPet.λP′et. [u]; u(P(u); P′(u))
(31) astr:uλPet.λP′et. maxu(u(P(u); P′(u)))
Themax-based deﬁnition of generalized quantiﬁcation correctly predicts that anaphora to restrictor/nuclear scope sets is
always anaphora tomaximal sets, i.e., E-type anaphora.11 The maximality of anaphora to quantiﬁer sets is an automatic con-
sequence of the fact that we independently needmax-operators to formulate truth-conditionally correct dynamicmeanings
for quantiﬁers. This is one of the major results in van den Berg [9], preserved in PCDRT.
The existential commitment associated with new dref introduction is built into (i) the deﬁnition of lexical relations in
(20) above (see the conjunct Iu1 /=#,...,un /=# /= ∅) and (ii) the deﬁnition of the operator u(. . .) in (26) above (see the conjunct
Iu /=# /= ∅). We need these non-emptiness requirements because the pair 〈∅st ,∅st〉 belongs, on one hand, to the denotation
of [u] for any dref u (see Deﬁnition (5) above) and, on the other hand, to the denotation of distu(D) for any dref u and DRS D
(see Deﬁnition (25) above).
There is, however, no existential commitment in the translation of detu,u′u, which employs the distributivity operator
〈u〉(. . .)deﬁned in (27) above. Theuse of 〈u〉(. . .) enables us to capture themeaning of bothupward anddownwardmonotonic
9 Nouwen [54, p. 87] was the ﬁrst to observe that we need to add the ﬁrst conjunct in (25) to the original deﬁnition of distributivity in van den Berg [9,
p. 145, (18)].
10 See Farkas [24] for a detailed investigation of various kinds of indeﬁnites within a related dynamic framework.
11 Recall the Evans examples Few senators admire Kennedy and they are very junior and Harry bought some
sheep. Bill vaccinated them – in addition to (10), (11) and (12) above.
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quantiﬁers by means of the same translation. The problem posed by downward monotonic quantiﬁers is that their nuclear
scope set can or has to be empty. For example, after a successful update with nou,u
′u, the nuclear scope set u′ is necessarily
empty, i.e., the dref u′ always stores only the dummy individual # relative to the output info state. This, in turn,means that no
lexical relation in the nuclear scope DRS that has u′ as an argument can be satisﬁed. The second conjunct Iu /=# = ∅ → I = J
in (27) resolves the conﬂict between the emptiness requirement enforced by a no-quantiﬁcation and the non-emptiness
requirement enforced by lexical relations.12,13
3.4. Singular number morphology
We turn now to the last component needed for the account of discourses (1) and (2), namely the representation of singular
pronouns. Their translation, provided in (34)below,has theexpectedMontagovian form: it is the type-lift of thedrefu theyare
anaphoric to, with the addition of the condition singleton{u}. The condition is contributed by singular number morphology
and requires uniqueness of the non-dummy value of the dref u relative to the current plural info state I. In contrast, plural
pronouns do not require uniqueness, as shown in (35) below.
(32) singleton{u} def= λIst . Iu /=# /= ∅ ∧ ∀is ∈ Iu /=#∀i′s ∈ Iu /=#(ui = ui′)
(33) u /= ∅ def= λIst . Iu /=# /= ∅
(34) sheuλPet. [singleton{u}]; P(u)
(35) theyuλPet. [u /= ∅]; P(u)14
(36) thesg:uλPet.λP′et. [singleton{u}]; P(u); P′(u)
(37) thepl:uλPet.λP′et. [u /= ∅]; P(u); P′(u)
(38) thesg:uλPet.λP′et. maxu(u(P(u))); [singleton{u}]; P′(u)
Theuniqueness enforcedby the condition singleton{u} is a ratherweak requirementbecause it is relativized to the current
plural info state.We can require uniqueness relative to the entiremodel (i.e., a stronger formof uniqueness) by combining the
maxu operator and the singleton{u} condition, as shown by the Russellian, non-anaphoric meaning for deﬁnite descriptions
provided in (38) above, which requires existence and model-level uniqueness. This meaning is needed to interpret the DP
12 Even if Deﬁnition (29) allows for empty restrictor and nuclear scope sets, we still capture the fact that subsequent anaphora to such empty sets is
infelicitous (e.g., anaphora to the nuclear scope sets in (11) and (12) above) because pronouns contribute non-emptiness requirements – see the singleton{u}
condition contributed by she in (34) below and the u /= ∅ condition contributed by they in (35).
13 The fact that the second conjunct in (27) requires the identity of the input and output states I and J correctly predicts that anaphora to both empty
restrictor/nuclear scope sets and indeﬁnites in restrictor/nuclear scope DRSs associated with such empty sets is infelicitous. For example, the nuclear scope
DRS of a successful nou,u
′u-quantiﬁcation, i.e., maxu′u(〈u′〉(P′(u′))), will always be a test. Hence, we correctly predict that anaphora to any indeﬁnites
in the nuclear scope of a no-quantiﬁcation is infelicitous, e.g., Harvey courts au
′′
woman at nou,u
′u convention. #Sheu′′ is very
pretty/#Theyu′′ are very pretty (on the ‘narrow-scope indeﬁnite’ reading).
14 This translation for plural pronouns is compatible with the ‘narrow-scope indeﬁnite’ reading intuitively associated with discourse (3) above. However,
if the plural pronoun is anaphoric to a non-atomic, group individual as in (i) below, the salient interpretation is the wide-scope indeﬁnite one – in contrast
to example (ii) below, where both the wide and narrow scope readings are available (I am grateful to E. Swanson for this observation and examples (i) and
(ii)).
(i) a. Harvey courts a pair of women at every convention.
b. They are friends.
(ii) a. Harvey courts a pair of women at every convention.
b. They are always friends.
We can account for this by distinguishing between discourse-level plurality (i.e., plural info states) and domain-level plurality (i.e., non-atomic individuals),
as proposed in Brasoveanu [12], and optionally strengthening the translation of plural pronouns to include a singleton condition, i.e., a discourse-level
singularity condition,while being compatiblewith domain-level plurality (e.g., a pair ofwomen). In contrast, singular pronouns require both discourse-level
singularity and domain-level singularity/atomicity. For concreteness, I provide translations for pronouns that are revised along these lines (the translations
for generalized determiners and indeﬁnites should be similarly modiﬁed).
(iii) atom{u} def= λIst . Iu /=# /= ∅ ∧ ∀is ∈ Iu /=#(atom(ui)),
where atom(x) requires the individual x to be atomic.
(iv) heuλPet. [singleton{u}, atom{u}]; P(u)
(v) theysingleton:uλPet. [singleton{u}]; P(u)
(vi) theyuλPet. [u /= ∅]; P(u)
The strengthening of plural pronouns with the singleton condition is a defeasible default – the weaker meaning without the singleton condition is needed
to account for the phenomena discussed in Section 4.1 below.
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the banquet in (2b) above. The alternative, anaphoric meanings for singular and plural deﬁnite articles (we need them
to interpret the anaphoric DP the woman in (2c) above, among others) are provided in (36) and (37) above; they are
parallel to the meanings for singular and plural pronouns in (34) and (35).15,16
The translation for proper names and the deﬁnitions of dynamic negation and truth are provided in (39), (40) and (41)
below. I take the default, empty context of interpretation for all discourses, i.e., the default input info state relative to which
a DRS is true/false, to be the singleton info state {i#} , where i# is the assignment that stores the dummy individual # relative
to all individual drefs. The info state {i#} formally encodes the fact that no anaphoric information is available in the empty
context.
(39) Harveyu λPet. [u | uHarvey]; P(u),
where Harvey
def= λis. harveye (i.e., Harvey is a ‘rigid’ individual dref).
(40) ∼D def= λIst . I /= ∅ ∧ ∀Hst /= ∅(H ⊆ I → ¬∃Kst(DHK))
(41) A DRS D of type t is truewith respect to an input info state Ist iff ∃Jst(DIJ).
Finally, the abbreviations in (42) and (43) below and the equalities in (44) and (45) enable us to simplify and enhance the
readability of some commonly occurring representations.
(42) u(C)
def= λIst . Iu /=# /= ∅ ∧ ∀xe ∈ uIu /=#(CIu=x),
where C is a condition (type (st)t).
(43) [u(u1, . . . , un)] def= λIst .λJst . Iu=# = Ju=# ∧ Iu /=#[u1, . . . , un]Ju /=#,
where u ∈ {u1, . . . , un} and [u1, . . . , un] def= [u1]; . . . ; [un].
(44) u([C1, . . . , Cm]) = [u(C1), . . . , u(Cm)]
(45) u([u1, . . . , un | C1, . . . , Cm]) = [u(u1, . . . , un) | u(C1), . . . , u(Cm)]
4. Quantiﬁcational subordination as structured anaphora
This section presents the analysis of discourses (1) and (2) and then shows that the very same system accounts for
other kinds of phenomena: telescoping discourses, quantiﬁcational subordination without quantiﬁers scoping over singular
anaphors (as, for example, always scopes over she in (2)), donkey anaphora to quantiﬁer domains, exceptional scope,
weak and strong donkey readings, same/different and quantiﬁer scope, etc.
We start with the two possible quantiﬁer scopings for the discourse-initial sentence (1a/2a). For simplicity, I will assume
that the two scopings are due to the two different lexical entries for the ditransitive verb court_at provided in (46)
and (47) below17: court_at1 assigns the indeﬁnite a woman wide scope relative to every convention, while
court_at2 assigns it narrow scope. I assume that the basic syntactic structure of the sentence is the one given in (48).
(46) court_at1 λQ ′(et)t.λQ ′′(et)t.λve. Q ′(λv′e. Q ′′(λv′′e. [court_at{v, v′, v′′}]))
(47) court_at2 λQ ′(et)t.λQ ′′(et)t.λve. Q ′′(λv′′e. Q ′(λv′e. [court_at{v, v′, v′′}]))
(48) Harvey [ [court_at1/2 [a woman]] [every convention] ]
Turning to the meaning of the quantiﬁer every convention, note that we can safely identify the restrictor and
nuclear scope drefs u and u′ of any everyu,u′u-quantiﬁcation: the deﬁnition in (29) above entails that, if J is an arbitrary
output state of a successfuleveryu,u
′u-quantiﬁcation,u andu′ have tobe identicalwith respect to both value and structure,
i.e., ∀js ∈ J(uj = u′j). We can therefore assume that every contributes only one dref, as shown in (49) below. I will also
assumethat the restrictor setof theeveryu1-quantiﬁcation isnon-empty, sowecansafely replace thedistributivityoperator
〈u1〉(. . .) with the simpler distributivity operator u1(. . .).
(49) everyu1λPet.λP′et. maxu1(u1(P(u1))); u1(P′(u1))
(50) everyu1 conventionλPet. maxu1([convention{u1}]); u1(P(u1))
(51) awk:u2 womanλPet. [u2 |woman{u2}]; u2(P(u2))
15 Semantically distinguishing between singular and plural deﬁnite articles is supported by the fact that other languages, e.g., Romance languages, have
overt number morphology on deﬁnite articles.
16 We can take the singular number morphology on indeﬁnite articles to also contribute a singleton condition. In contrast to singular pronouns and
singular deﬁnites, this condition is in the scope of a distributivity operator, which ensures its vacuous satisfaction. The two resulting translations are
provided below. They are equivalent to the translations in (30) and (31) above.
awk:uλPet.λP′et. [u]; u([singleton{u}]; P(u); P′(u))
astr:uλPet.λP′et. maxu(u([singleton{u}]; P(u); P′(u)))
The neutralization of the singleton requirement in the case of singular indeﬁnites is necessary to capture the semantic number neutrality of morphologically
singular donkey anaphora – see Section 4.4 below for more discussion.
17 This is just a matter of presentational convenience – any quantiﬁer scoping mechanism proposed in the literature would be equally suitable.
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(52) awk:u2 woman>>everyu1 convention
[u2 |woman{u2}]; u2(maxu1([convention{u1}])); [u2(court_at{Harvey, u2, u1})]
(53) everyu1 convention>>awk:u2 woman
maxu1([convention{u1}]); [u1(u2) | u1(woman{u2}), u1(court_at{Harvey, u2, u1})]
The representations of the two quantiﬁer scopings for sentence (1a/2a) are provided in (52) and (53) above (redundant
distributivity operators are omitted). For simplicity, I take the translation of the proper nameHarvey to beλPet. P(Harvey)
instead of the more complex one in (39) above. For the time being, I will also assume that the indeﬁnite a woman is weak
because the resulting representations are somewhat simpler. We will return to this issue in due course.
The representation in (52) updates the default input info state {i#} as follows. First, we non-deterministically introduce
somenon-empty (i.e., non-dummy) set of individuals relative to the dref u2. Then,we test that each u2-individual is awoman.
Then, relative to each u2-individual, we introduce the set of all conventions and store it in the dref u1. Finally, we test that, for
each u2-woman and for each of the corresponding u1-conventions (i.e., in this case: for every convention), Harvey courted
her at the convention. The output info state obtained after updating with (52) contains a non-empty set of u2-women that
where courted by Harvey at every convention and, relative to each u2-woman, u1 stores the set of all conventions.
The representation in (53) updates the default input info state {i#} as follows. First, we introduce the set of all conventions
relative to the dref u1. Then, for each u1-convention, we introduce a u2-set of individuals. Finally, we test that, for every u1-
convention, each of the corresponding u2-individuals are women and are such that Harvey courted them at the convention
under consideration. The output info state obtained after updating with (53) stores the set of all conventions under the dref
u1 and, relative to each u1-convention, the dref u2 stores a non-empty set of women (possibly different from convention to
convention) that Harvey courted at that particular convention.
We can now see how sentence (1b) – in particular, the singular number morphology on the pronoun sheu2 – forces the
‘wide-scope indeﬁnite’ reading: the condition singleton{u2} in (54) and (55) below effectively conﬂates the two scopings
by requiring the set of u2-women obtained after updating with (52) or (53) to be a singleton. This requirement leaves the
truth-conditionsderivedon thebasis of (52) untouched, butmakes the truth-conditions associatedwith (53) strictly stronger.
(54) sheu2λPet. [singleton{u2}]; P(u2)
(55) sheu2 is very pretty[singleton{u2}, very_pretty{u2}]
In contrast, sentence (2b) contains the adverb of quantiﬁcation alwaysu1 , which can take scope above or below the
singularpronounsheu2 . In the former case, theu2-uniqueness requirement isweakened (i.e., in a sense, neutralized)bybeing
relativized to u1-conventions. As shown in (56) below, I take themeaning of alwaysu1 to be a universal quantiﬁcation over
an anaphorically retrieved restrictor, i.e., over the nuclear scope set introduced by the quantiﬁereveryu1 convention in
the preceding sentence. Sincealways is basically interpreted asevery (modulo the anaphorically retrieved restrictor), its
translation is parallel to the translation forevery in (49) above. The general format for the interpretation of quantiﬁcational





Thedeﬁnitedescriptionthe banquet in (2b) is intuitivelyaRusselliandeﬁnitedescription (see (38) above),whichcon-
tributes existence and model-level uniqueness (relativized to conventions: there is a unique banquet per convention18). For
simplicity, however, I will assume that sentence (2b) contributes a transitive predication of the form come_with_Harvey_to_
banquet_of (abbreviated c.t.b.of ) relatingwomen and conventions, which, as shown in (58) and (59) below, can be translated
in two different ways corresponding to the two possible relative scopes of sheu2 and alwaysu1 (that is, the scoping
technique is the same as in (46) and (47) above).
The translation in (58) belowgives the pronounsheu2 wide scope relative to the adverbalwaysu1 , while the translation
in (59) gives the pronoun narrow scope relative to the adverb.
(58) come_to_banquet_of1 λQ (et)t.λQ ′(et)t. Q ′(λv′e. Q(λve. [c.t.b.of {v′, v}]))
(59) come_to_banquet_of2 λQ (et)t.λQ ′(et)t. Q(λve. Q ′(λv′e. [c.t.b.of {v′, v}]))
(60) she [[always] come_to_banquet_of1/2]
The corresponding representations of sentence (2b), obtained on the basis of the syntactic structure in (60) above, are
provided in (61) and (62) below.
18 Theexistenceanduniquenessarecontributedby theRusselliandeﬁnitearticle, translatedas:theu3λPet.λP′et. maxu3 (u3 (P(u3))); [singleton{u3}];
P′(u3). The relational noun banquet is anaphoric to u1-conventions and is translated as: banquetu1λve. [banquet{v, u1}] (intuitively, the set of
banquets organized at convention u1). Putting the two translations together, we obtain the following representation for our Russellian deﬁnite description:
(i)theu3 banquetu1λPet. maxu3 ([banquet{u3, u1}]); [singleton{u3}]; P(u3)
The relativized uniqueness effect, i.e., the intuition that the banquet is unique per u1-convention, is due to the fact that the deﬁnite description is in the
scope of the adverb alwaysu1 and, therefore, in the scope of the distributivity operator u1 (. . .) contributed by the adverb. For a way to unify anaphoric
and Russellian deﬁnite descriptions and assign a single meaning to the deﬁnite article, see Section 4.5 below.
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(61) sheu2>>alwaysu1[singleton{u2}, c.t.b.of {u2, u1}]
(62) alwaysu1>>sheu2[u1(singleton{u2}), c.t.b.of {u2, u1}]
Thus, there are two possible representations for sentence (2a), i.e., (52) and (53), and two possible representations for
sentence (2b), i.e., (61) and (62). Out of the four combinations, three end up effectively requiring the indeﬁnite awk:u2
woman to have wide scope relative to everyu1 convention. The fourth combination (53 + 62), provided in (63)
below, encodes the ‘narrow-scope indeﬁnite’ reading that is intuitively available for discourse (2), but not for (1). All the
redundant distributivity operators are omitted in (63).
(63) maxu1([convention{u1}]); [u1(u2) |woman{u2}, court_at{Harvey, u2, u1}]; [u1(singleton{u2}), c.t.b.of {u2, u1}]
The representation in (63) updates the default input info state {i#} as follows. First, we introduce the set of all conventions
relative to the dref u1, followed by the introduction of a non-empty set of u2-individuals relative to each u1-convention. The
remainder of the representation tests that, for each u1-convention, the corresponding u2-set is a singleton set whose sole
member is a woman that is courted by Harvey at the u1-convention under consideration and that comes with him to the
banquet of that convention.
Summarizing, PCDRT enables us to formulate a compositional dynamic account of the intra- and cross-sentential inter-
actions between generalized quantiﬁers, anaphora and numbermorphology exhibited by the quantiﬁcational subordination
discourses in (1) and (2) above. The main proposal is that plural info states together with a suitable dynamic reformulation
of the independently motivated static denotation for generalized determiners enable us to account for quantiﬁcational
subordination in terms of structured anaphora to quantiﬁer domains.
4.1. Telescoping and quantiﬁcational subordination without quantiﬁers scoping over singular anaphors
The quantiﬁcational subordination discourse in (2) above contains an overt adverb of quantiﬁcation that licenses the
narrow-scope indeﬁnite reading. There are, however, cases in which such a reading is licensed without any overt quantiﬁca-
tional element scoping over the singular pronoun, as shown by (64) (from Sells [75]) and (65) (see [66, p. 216, (1′)]) below.
(64) a. Everyu chess set comes with au
′
spare pawn.
b. Itu′ is taped to the top of the box.
(65) a. Everyu frog that saw anu
′
insect ate itu′.
b. Itu′ disappeared forever.
(66) a. Everyu frog that saw anu
′
insect ate itu′.
b. #Itu′ was a fly.
The felicitous examples in (64) and (65) contrast with the infelicitous example in (66) (see [66, p. 216, (1)]) above.
This contrast suggests that the availability of quantiﬁcational subordination without an overt quantiﬁcational element is
more constrained than ordinary quantiﬁcational subordination, as suggested in Karttunen [42], Gawron [29], Roberts [66],
Wang et al. [79] among others. The present account is well equipped to capture this generalization – as things stand, we
predict that quantiﬁcational subordination without an overt quantiﬁcational element should always be infelicitous. This
is a consequence of the conﬂict between the singleton condition contributed by singular pronouns and the non-singleton
requirement associatedwith the restrictor set of a generalized determiner, argued for in Green [32], Neale [53] and Chierchia
[15]amongothers–andwhichcanbe formalizedbymeansofanon-singletoncondition, as shownin (67)and (68)below.19,20
(67) non-singleton{u} def= λIst . Iu /=# /= ∅ ∧ ∃is ∈ Iu /=#∃i′s ∈ Iu /=#(ui /= ui′)
(68) detu,u′uλPet.λP′et. maxu(u(P(u))); [non-singleton{u}]; maxu′u(〈u′〉(P′(u′))); [DET{u, u′}]
Thus, we capture the observation in van den Berg [9] (see also [55,79]) that quantiﬁcational subordination without an
overt quantiﬁer scoping over the quantiﬁcationally subordinated anaphor is problematic only when the anaphor is singular
(the same applies to telescoping – see the discussion below). If the anaphor is plural, structured anaphora to quantiﬁer
domains is acceptable, as shown by (69) (see [9, p. 168, (16)]) and (70) below. This is a consequence of the fact that only
singular anaphors contribute a singleton condition that contradicts thenon-singleton condition contributed by generalized
determiners, while plural anaphora to quantiﬁer domains is by default felicitous because no such conﬂict arises.
(69) a. Everyu man loves au
′
woman.
b. Theyu bring themu′ flowers to prove this.
19 Green [32] and Chierchia [15] among others argue that this non-singleton requirement has presuppositional status. In contrast, Neale [53] suggests that
it is in fact an implicature. I ﬁnd the arguments in Green [32] more persuasive, but I leave a more careful investigation of this issue for future research. For
simplicity, I will take the non-singleton condition contributed by generalized determiners to be part of the assertion.
20 The non-singleton{u} condition enables us to use the simpler distributivity operator u(. . .) instead of 〈u〉(. . .) when we translate the restrictors of
generalized determiners – as shown in (68) above.
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(70) a. Everyu frog that saw anu
′
insect ate itu′.
b. Theyu′ were all flies.
We can capture the fact that quantiﬁcationally subordinated singular anaphors that occur by themselves (i.e., without
other quantiﬁcational elements in the same sentence) are felicitous only in restricted contexts by proposing that covert
distributivity operators u(. . .) with scope over the singular anaphors are licensed only in particular kinds of contexts. Such
distributivity operators resolve the conﬂict between the singleton and non-singleton conditions (contributed by singular
pronouns and generalized determiners respectively) because they basically neutralize the singleton condition, much like
always neutralizes this condition in discourse (2) above. This is schematically shown in (71) below.
(71) a. Everyu non-singleton{u} frog that saw anu′ insect ate it.
b.  u(Itu′ singleton{u′} disappeared forever). vs.
c. # Itu′ singleton{u′} was a ﬂy.
The continuation in (71c) is infelicitous because the singleton{u′} condition is interpreted relative to the entire plural
info state, requiring the set of all insects under consideration to be a singleton. But, since the same insect cannot be typically
eaten by two or more frogs, it follows that, if there is only one u′-insect, there can be only one u-frog, which contradicts
the non-singleton{u} condition contributed by the determiner everyu. In contrast, the continuation in (71b) is felicitous
because the singleton{u′} condition is in the scope of the distributivity operator u(. . .), which requires u′-insects to be
unique relative to each u-frog.
Various factors determine when a covert distributivity operator can be licensed, ranging from world knowledge, e.g.,
knowledge of scripts, as proposed in Poesio [59], to the rhetorical structure of discourse, e.g., Wang et al. [79] propose
that discourses like (71b) are felicitous because the two discourse segments containing the antecedent and the anaphor
(respectively) are linked by a particular discourse relation.
The task of identifying the relevant generalizations goes beyond the contributions that PCDRT, as a semantic theory, can
make. The goal of this section is only to show that the very same ingredients that are required to analyze ‘ordinary’ cases
of quantiﬁcational subordination like (2) above can also: (i) capture the fact that, in general, the distribution of singular
cross-sentential anaphora is more restricted than the distribution of plural anaphora and (ii) provide the kind of semantic
representations (in particular, discourse-level distributivity operators) that can be straightforwadly interfaced with more
general pragmatic reasoning involving world knowledge and rhetorical relations.
The restricted licensing of covert distributivity operators also enables us to capture the restricted distribution and the
intuitively correct interpretation of telescoping discourses like the ones in (72) (see [63, p. 36, (38)]) and (73) (see [63, p. 36,
(34)], attributed to B. Partee) below, where a singular pronoun is cross-sententially anaphoric to a quantiﬁer domain. The
term “telescoping” is due to Roberts [63,64] and is meant to convey the intuition that, in such discourses, “from a discussion
of the general case, we zoom in to examine a particular instance” [63, p. 36].
(72) a. Eachu candidate for the space mission meets all our requirements.
b. Heu has a PhD in Astrophysics and extensive prior flight experience.
(73) a. Eachu degree candidate walked to the stage.
b. Heu took hisu diploma from the Dean and returned to hisu seat.
(74) a. Eachu non-singleton{u} candidate for the space mission …
b.  u(Heu singleton{u} has a PhD in Astrophysics …)
The distributivity operators u(. . .) that we employ to account for such discourses – as shown schematically in (74) above
– formally capture the telescoping/zooming-in intuition in a rather direct way: discourse-level distributivity u(. . .) ‘breaks’
a plural info state into sub-states that each store a particular u-individual, i.e., the updates in the scope of a distributivity
operator are evaluated one individual/one case at a time. Therefore, the singleton{u} condition contributed by a singular
anaphor is effectively cancelled in the scope of a distributivity operator u(. . .) because it is vacuously satisﬁed.
Thus, the present account of telescoping is, in a nutshell, just this: a singular pronoun anaphoric to a quantiﬁer domain
contributes a singleton condition that requires zooming-in/telescoping, i.e., the covert insertion of a distributivity operator,
to be successfully interpreted.21
As already mentioned, the possibility of licensing such covert distributivity operators that ‘rescue’ singular anaphors is
dependent on various factors, including the rhetorical structure of the discourse under consideration. In fact, one of themain
observations about telescoping, which can be traced back to Fodor and Sag [26] and Evans [19], is that “the possibility of
anaphoric relations in such […] cases depends in part on the plausibility of some sort of narrative continuity between the
utterances in the discourse” [63, p. 36]. This narrative continuity licenses a covert distributivity operator u(. . .), without
which the two conditions non-singleton{u} and singleton{u} would contradict each other and the update would fail. The
exact nature of the necessary narrative continuity remains to bedetermined– amore systematic empirical research is needed
to ascertain what distinguishes felicitous examples of telescoping from the infelicitous ones in (75) [19, p. 220, (21)],22 (76)
[59, p. 347, (1)] and (77) [59, p. 360, (39c)] below.
21 Nouwen [55] proposes basically the same analysis of telescoping, as I learned only in the very last stages of revising this paper.
22 Page references to Evans [20].
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(75) #Everyu congressman came to the party and heu had a marvellous time.
(76) #Everyu dog came in. Itu lay down under the table.
(77) #Eachu dog came in. Itu lay down under the table.
Summarizing, the challenge posed by telescoping and quantiﬁcational subordination discourses in which there are no
quantiﬁers scoping over the singular anaphors is that we need to be able to account for both felicitous discourses like (64),
(65), (69), (70), (72) and (73) above and infelicitous discourses like (66), (75), (76) and (77).
DRT/FCS/DPL-based approaches [35,36,38,39] fail because they can account only for the infelicitous discourses, but not
for the felicitous ones. This is a direct consequence of the fact that generalized quantiﬁers are externally static in this kind
of systems. In contrast, Dynamic Montague Grammar (DMG, [34]) and related systems, e.g., Chierchia [15], take generalized
quantiﬁers to be externally dynamic and fail in the opposite way: they can account for the felicitous discourses, but not
for the infelicitous ones. Moreover, DMG does not derive the correct truth-conditions for all the felicitous telescoping and
quantiﬁcational subordination discourses (see the discussion in [59, pp. 357–359]).
The (discourse structure based) accounts in Poesio [59], Roberts [65,66] and Wang et al. [79] among others are more
ﬂexible and can account for both classes of discourses. These accounts differ with respect to their main strategy of analysis:
Poesio [59] and Roberts [65,66] take the infelicitous examples to be the basic ones and then devise special accommodation-
basedmechanisms that make available and pass on the relevant discourse information in the case of the felicitous examples.
In contrast, Wang et al. [79] take the felicitous examples to be the basic ones and assumes that the relevant discourse
information is always available – but that it has to accessed in a particular way, crucially regulated by rhetorical relations
between discourse segments.
The account proposed here (and, independently, in Nouwen [55]) falls in the same category as Wang et al. [79]: plural
info states ensure that the relevant anaphoric information is always available, but the singular number morphology on the
anaphoric pronoun constrains the way in which it can be accessed. This enables us to avoid the mechanisms of DRS accom-
modation invoked by Poesio [59] and Roberts [65,66] (see also [63,64]) that treat anaphora to quantiﬁcational dependencies
as an exceptional phenomenon. The fact that plural anaphora is felicitous in pretty much all the cases we considered points
to the fact that quantiﬁcational dependencies are, as a general rule, anaphorically accessible.
The main differences between Wang et al. [79] and the present account is that the latter builds on a simpler semantics
– simpler with respect to the requisite notion of plural info state and the operators manipulating such plural info states –
and streamlines the semantics/pragmatics interface insofar as the crucial point of contact between the two is the pragmatic
licensing of covert distributivity operators.
Finally, the present analysis takes into account the semantic contribution made by number morphology – unlike van den
Berg [9] among others – and, in this sense, it is a development of a suggestion made in Evans [19, p. 220] with respect to
example (75) above:Evansproposes that the infelicityof this example is a consequenceof a clash in semanticnumberbetween
the antecedent and the anaphor (note that there is no clash in morphological number). This clash is cashed out in PCDRT as
the conﬂict between the fact that the quantiﬁcational antecedent requires the quantiﬁer domain to be a non-singleton set,
while the singular pronoun anaphoric to this set requires it to be a singleton.
Paying attention to the semantic contribution of number morphology has additional beneﬁts: it enables us to derive the
fact that felicitous quantiﬁcational subordination discourses exhibit relativized uniqueness effects. For example, in discourse
(2), the courted woman is unique per convention and, in discourse (64), the spare pawn is unique per chess set. Importantly,
discourse (64) contrasts with the non-subordination discourse in (78) below (also from Sells [75]), which does not exhibit
relativized uniqueness effects – a contrast that is captured by the PCDRT account.23
(78) Every chess set comes with a spare pawn that is taped to the top of the box.
4.2. Donkey anaphora to quantiﬁer domains
The same meanings for generalized determiners and singular/plural anaphors enable us to account for the three-way
contrast between the discourses in (79), (80) and (81) below, i.e., for the fact that donkey anaphora to quantiﬁer domains
has to be plural.
(79) Everyu boy who read au
′
‘Harry Potter’ book recommended itu′ to hisu friends.
(80) #Everyu boy who read everyu
′
‘Harry Potter’ book recommended itu′ to hisu friends.
(81) Everyu boy who read everyu
′
‘Harry Potter’ book recommended themu′ to hisu friends.
23 The meanings for singular and plural pronouns in (34) and (35) above also account for the fact that the most salient interpretation of the discourse
below [79, p. 7, (20)] is that all men love the samewoman, i.e., the wide-scope indeﬁnite reading, in contrast to the discourse in (69) above, where the most
salient reading is the narrow-scope indeﬁnite one.
(i) Everyu man loves au
′
woman. Theyu bring heru′ flowers to prove this.
We can obtain the narrow-scope indeﬁnite reading for this discourse – to the extent it is available – if we take plural pronouns to be optionally interpreted
as distributive, i.e., theyuλPet. [u /= ∅]; u(P(u)).
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DRT/FCS/DPL-based accounts can capture only the contrast between examples (79) and (80). The infelicity of (80) follows
from the assumption made by these accounts that generalized quantiﬁcation is externally static – but, by the same token,
such accounts cannot capture the fact that plural donkey anaphora to quantiﬁer domains of the kind instantiated in (81) is
felicitous.
We capture the three-way contrast between (79), (80) and (81) in the same way in which we capture the contrast
between singular and plural anaphora in quantiﬁcational subordination and telescoping discourses: the infelicity of singular
anaphora is a consequence of the clash between the non-singleton condition contributed by the generalized determiner
and the singleton condition contributed by the singular anaphor. The account also covers examples like (82) below, where
the most-subset of ‘Harry Potter’ books that were read can vary from boy to boy.
(82) Everyu boy who read mostu
′
‘Harry Potter’ books recommended themu′ to hisu friends.
Finally, infelicitous donkey sentences like (83) below, in which the indeﬁnite is singular and the pronoun is plural, can
be ruled out if we take them to instantiate a clash in morphological/syntactic number. That is, following once again in the
footsteps of Evans [19],weassumeadistinctionbetweenmorphological/syntactic number and semantic number: telescoping
discourses like (75) above and singular donkey anaphora to quantiﬁers like the one in (80) above are infelicitous because they
involve a clash in semantic number (but not in morphological/syntactic number), while donkey sentences like (83) below
are infelicitous because they involve amismatch inmorphological/syntactic number (but no clash in semantic number since
plural pronouns are compatible with semantic singularity24).
(83) #Every boyu who read au
′
‘Harry Potter’ book recommended themu′ to hisu friends.
4.3. Exceptional scope as quantiﬁcational subordination
This subsection (based on joint work with D.F. Farkas – see [13]) outlines a novel solution to the problem of exceptional
scope (ES) of (in)deﬁnites, ﬁrst noticed in Farkas [21] and Fodor and Sag [26] – a problem that is still open despite the many
insightful attempts in the literature to solve it. The novel account brings further empirical support for the way in which we
capture anaphora to quantiﬁcational dependencies (i.e., structured anaphora) in natural language.
The ES cases wewill focus on are the intermediate andwidest scope readings of (84), the ﬁrst-order translations of which
are provided in (86) and (87) below, respectively. Note that the narrowest scope reading is truth-conditionally the strongest
reading (under the assumption that natural language quantiﬁcation presupposes that its restrictor set is non-empty) – unlike
the usual Every student read a paper kind of examples, in which the narrowest scope reading is the weakest.
(84) Everyur student of mine read everyu′ poem that au′′r′′ famous Romanian poet wrote before
World War II.
(85) Narrowest scope (NS) indeﬁnite: ∀x(stud(x) → ∀y(poem(y) ∧ ∃z(poet(z) ∧ write(z, y)) → read(x, y)))
(86) a. Intermediate scope (IS) indeﬁnite: ∀x(stud(x) → ∃z(poet(z) ∧ ∀y(poem(y) ∧ write(z, y) → read(x, y))))
b. Context for the IS reading: (At thebeginningof theacademicyear:)Everyr student chose ar
′′
(different)
poet. (By the end of the academic year, it turned out that:) (84)
(87) a. Widest scope (WS) indeﬁnite: ∃z(poet(z) ∧ ∀x(stud(x) → ∀y(poem(y) ∧ write(z, y) → read(x, y))))
b. Context for the WS reading: (At the beginning of the academic year:) Everyr student chose ar
′′
poet -
ther′′ same poet. (By the end of the academic year, it turned out that:) (84)
The crucial observation is that the availability of the ES readings is dependent on the context relative to which sentence
(84) is interpreted. In particular, the IS reading is available when (84) is interpreted in the context provided by (86b), which
in fact forces an IS interpretation. Similarly, the WS reading is the only available one in the context provided by (87b). Thus,
I follow [22, p. 184] in taking scope to be essentially discoursal: the syntax/semantics interface underdetermines scopal
relations – it only speciﬁes “when an expressionmay be in the scope of another, but not when it must be in its scope.”25
The proposal is that ES readings are available when sentence (84) is interpreted as an instance of quantiﬁcational sub-
ordination, i.e., as anaphoric to quantiﬁer domains and quantiﬁcational dependencies introduced in the previous discourse.
That is, the ES readings occur when the two every determiners and the indeﬁnite article in (84) further elaborate on the
sets of individuals and the correlations between them introduced in (86b) and (87b).
The IS interpretation arises because of the presence in the input discourse context of a function pairing u-students and
u′′-Romanian poets that rules out the possibility of covariation between u′′-poets and u′-poems. The WS reading arises
because the value of the discourse referent (dref) r′′, i.e., the value of the domain restrictor for the indeﬁnite, is constant,
24 Much like in the static semantics for number morphology proposed in Sauerland [70].
25 That is, quantiﬁcational subordination in the more general sense of structured anaphora to quantiﬁer domains is a very common phenomenon – it is,
for example, the source of the joke below, where the domain of the quantiﬁer very few people ought to be restricted by the generic quantiﬁcation
in the previous sentence.
(i) If you live to be one hundred, you’ve got it made.Very few people die past that age (George Burns).
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thereby ruling out any possibility of covariation. Finally, theNS reading arises by default, when there are no special contextual
restrictions on the indeﬁnite article and the every determiners.
Unlike the tradition inaugurated in Fodor and Sag [26] and varied upon in Reinhart [62] and Kratzer [45], (in)deﬁnites
are not ambiguous between their ordinary existential meanings and choice-function based meanings. Moreover, there is
no need to posit covert syntactic movement violating island constraints, special storage mechanisms (as in Abusch [1]) or
special choice-functional variables (as in Winter [80]). The proposal builds on the insight in Schwarzschild [74] concerning
the crucial role of contextual restrictions in the genesis of ES readings without, however, relying on his singleton quantiﬁer
domain restriction.
The analysis relies on two independently motivated assumptions: (i) the discourse context stores not only (sets of)
individuals that are mentioned in discourse, but also dependencies between them (already needed for quantiﬁcational
subordination, telescoping and donkey anaphora), and (ii) quantiﬁer domains are always contextually restricted [25]. The
compositionally obtained update contributed by (84) is provided in (91) below (simpliﬁed in various ways, e.g., redundant
distributivity operators are omitted).
(88) detur,u′uλPet.λP′et. maxur(u(P(u))); [non-singleton{u}]; maxu′u(〈u′〉(P′(u′))); [DET{u, u′}]




If there is no anaphora to the dref u′′ introduced by the indeﬁnite, this can be substituted salva veritate with the
non-max translation:
au
′′r′′λPet.λP′et. [u′′ | u′′  r′′]; u′′(P(u′′); P′(u′′))
(see Section 4.4 below for more discussion)
(91) (84)maxur([stud{u}]); [non-singleton{u}]; u(maxu′(u′([poem{u′}]; [u′′ | u′′  r′′, poet{u′′}, write{u′′, u′}])));[non-singleton{u′}]; [read{u, u′}]
The update in (91) can be paraphrased as follows: ﬁrst, we introduce the dref u and store in it all the speaker’s students
among the previously introduced r-individuals (as required by maxur). Then, relative to each u-student (as required by
the distributivity operator u(. . .)), we introduce the set of all poems written by a Romanian poet and store these poems in
dref u′, while storing the corresponding poets in dref u′′. Finally, we test that each u-student read each of the corresponding
u′-poems. The output info state obtained after updating with (91) stores the set of all r-students in dref u, the corresponding
r′′-Romanian poets in u′′ and the set of all poems written by a u′′-poet in u′.
The update in (91) yields the NS indeﬁnite reading if there are no special constraints on the restrictor drefs r and r′′. If
the discourse context places particular constraints on these drefs, as the sentences in (86b) and (87b) above do, the update
in (91) yields different truth-conditions, namely the truth-conditions associated with the IS and WS readings.
Consider the update contributed by sentence (86b) ﬁrst, provided in (92) below (simpliﬁed in various ways): the output
info state obtained after we process (92) stores a dependency associating each r-student with the r′′-poet that s/he chose.
Consequently, the update in (91) above will retrieve this dependency and further elaborate on it, thereby yielding the IS
reading.
(92) The context for the IS reading: everyr student chose ar′′ poet
maxr([stud{r}]); [non-singleton{r}]; r([r′′ | poet{r′′}, choose{r, r′′}])
Similarly, the update contributed by sentence (87b) – provided in (93) below – ensures that the output info state stores
the same r′′-poet relative to every r-student. This is required by the update-ﬁnal singleton{r′′} condition contributed by
the parenthetical ther′′ same poet.26 Crucially, this condition is outside the scope of the distributivity operator r(. . .)
introduced by everyr . When the update in (91) anaphorically retrieves and elaborates on this contextually singleton indeﬁ-
nite (i.e., singleton in the plural info state, but not necessarily relative to the entiremodel or the entire contextually-provided
resource situation – as Schwarzschild [74] would have it), we obtain the WS reading.
(93) The context for the WS reading: everyr student chose ar′′ poet - ther′′ same poet
maxr([stud{r}]); [non-singleton {r}]; r([r′′ | poet{r′′}, choose{r, r′′}]); [singleton{r′′}]
Summarizing, the three readings of sentence (84) differ with respect to whether the indeﬁnite covaries with another DP
or not, and if it does, which of the two every-DPs it covaries with. Traditionally, this sort of (in)dependence was the result
of the structural relation between the existential quantiﬁer contributed by the indeﬁnite and the two universal quantiﬁers
contributed by the twoevery-DPs. Previous in situ analyses employ implicit arguments present in the interpretation of the
indeﬁnite (as arguments of a choice function or as implicit arguments in its restrictor) that could be left free (WS reading) or
that could be bound by the ﬁrst universal (IS reading) or the second (NS reading). In contrast, the present account dispenses
with bound implicit arguments in favor of independently needed, contextually introduced and stored dependencies.
Finally, the present account of exceptional scope as structured anaphora to quantiﬁer domains generalizes to downward
entailing contexts. That is, unlike some choice-/Skolem-function based approaches, we can solve the problem posed by
26 See Section 4.6 below for more discussion of the meaning of same.
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exceptional scope readings in downward entailing contexts (noticed in Chierchia [16]). To see what the puzzle is, consider
sentence (94) below. Its most salient reading, provided in (95), has the indeﬁnite someu
′′r′′ taking exceptional scope
intermediately between the two universal quantiﬁers.
(94) Everyur linguist that studied everyu′ solution that someu′′r′′ problem might have has
become famous.
(95) The most salient reading of (94):
∀x(ling(x) ∧ ∃z(prob(z) ∧ ∀y(sol(y) ∧ might_have(z, y) → study(x, y))) → famous(x))
(96) ∀x(ling(x) ∧ ∀y(sol(y) ∧ might_have(f (prob), y) → study(x, y)) → famous(x))
(97) ∀x(ling(x) ∧ ∃f (∀y(sol(y) ∧ might_have(f (prob), y) → study(x, y))) → famous(x))
As Chierchia [16] observes, ‘free choice-function variable’ approaches like Kratzer [45] represent sentence (94) as shown
in (96) above (‘top-level existential closure’ approaches like Matthewson [51] derive a representation that, for our current
purposes, is virtually identical), while the ‘intermediate existential closure’ approaches in Reinhart [62] and Winter [80]
represent it as shown in (97).
Ifwe assume togetherwith [16] that any choice function can in principle be contextually assigned to a free choice-function
variable (but see [46] for an argument against this assumption), then the former kind of approaches derive truth conditions
that are too weak: (96) is veriﬁed by any problem for which some linguist did not study every solution – this makes the
antecedent false and thewhole formula in (96) true (see also the argument in Schwarz [73] that ‘free choice-function variable’
approaches undergenerate).
Intermediate-closure approaches derive the correct truth conditions – but allowing for such intermediate-level existential
closure of choice-function variables nulliﬁes much of the initial motivation for them, namely that they enable us to give the
indeﬁnite exceptional scope (semantically), while syntactically leaving it in situ. If this kind of existential closure is needed,
allowing for non-local existential closure of individual-level variables as in Abusch [1] (which obviates the need for choice
functions) might prove to be the more parsimonious theoretical decision.
In contrast, our account proceeds as before: in a context like (98) below, which provides a suitable dependency between
the restrictordrefs r and r′′, the representationof sentence (94), given in (100), derives the intuitively correct truth-conditions.
(98) Context for the most salient reading of (94): Every scientistr has ar
′′
favorite problem that sher
studied systematically. (And being systematic is enough to bring one fame in linguistics – so:) (94)
(99) (98)maxr([scientist{r}]); [non-singleton{r}]; r([r′′ | prob{r′′}, study{r, r′′}, have{r, r′′}])
(100) (94)maxur(u([ling{u}];maxu′(u′([sol{u′}]; [u′′ | u′′  r′′, prob{u′′}, might_have{u′′, u′}])); [non-singleton{u′}];[study{u, u′}])); [non-singleton{u}]; [famous{u}]
The present account of the ES example in (94) does not face the same problems as choice-/Skolem-function analyses
because the quantiﬁer every is not analyzed in terms of material implication. The account also generalizes to other kinds
of downward entailing contexts besides the restrictor of every . Consider, for example, the wide-scope negation sentence
in (101) below, also fromChierchia [16].We can derive the correct truth conditions for this sentence, provided in (102) below,
if we represent it as shown in (103). The crucial point is the introduction/accommodation of the dref r′′ that provides the
domain restrictor for the indeﬁnite someu
′′r′′ problem intermediately between the two universal quantiﬁers everyu
linguist and everyu′ solution.
(101) Not everyu linguist studied everyu
′
solution that someu
′′r′′ problem might have.
(102) The most salient reading of (101): ¬∀x(ling(x) → ∃z(prob(z) ∧ ∀y(sol(y) ∧ might_have(z, y) → study(x, y)))).
Or, equivalently:
∃x(ling(x) ∧ ∀z(prob(z) → ∃y(sol(y) ∧ might_have(z, y) ∧ ¬study(x, y))))
(103) [∼ (maxu([ling{u}]); [r′′]; [non-singleton{u}];
u(max
u′(u′([sol{u′}]; [u′′ | u′′  r′′, prob{u′′}, might_have{u′′, u′}])); [non-singleton{u′}]; [study{u, u′}]))]
The account of ES in terms of restrictor dref accommodation can be thought of as an extreme case of the proposed
account of ES as structured anaphora to quantiﬁer domains: anaphora is resolved by accommodation. Accommodation is the
preferred kind of resolution in downward entailing contexts because it results in the strongest reading.
Accommodating the restrictor dref for the indeﬁnite between the two universal quantiﬁers does the work of the inter-
mediate existential closure of choice-function variables in Reinhart [62] and Winter [80]. The present proposal is different
from these accounts in that it does not need choice-function variables/drefs. Nor does it need a special storage mechanism
as Abusch [1], an indexing mechanism as Farkas [22] or a special presupposition for speciﬁc indeﬁnites as Geurts [31]. What
we need instead is a freely available accommodation procedure for the drefs that restrict indeﬁnites.
The two options for restricting indeﬁnites – by anaphorically retrieving restrictor drefs or, alternatively, by accommo-
dating these drefs – correspond to the contextual analysis of exceptional scope in Kratzer [45] and the ‘free existential
closure’ analyses in Reinhart [62] and Winter [80], respectively. The process of non-locally accommodating restrictor drefs
is constrained: on one hand, it is possible only for indeﬁnites, but not for deﬁnites or generalized determiners, and, on the
other hand, it is constrained even for indeﬁnites, e.g., as Endriss [18] argues, such indeﬁnites need to have a topical status.
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4.4. Weak and strong donkey readings
The availability of domain-restricting drefs r, r′, etc. enables us to provide a non-ambiguity analysis ofweak/strong donkey
readings that improves on the proposal in (30) and (31) above.
Donkey anaphora provided one of the main incentives for developing a dynamic semantics for natural language – but
DRT/FCS/DPL-based accounts of donkey anaphora face a couple of problems, one of which is the availability of both weak
and strong readings for donkey sentences, already exempliﬁed in (8) and (9) above. There are a variety of proposals in the
literature to revise thenotionof quantiﬁcation in classical dynamic semantics in such away that bothweak and strongdonkey
readings are allowed. Although most of the revised systems can handle the simple weak and strong donkey sentences in (8)
and (9), they cannot account for mixed weak and strong relative-clause donkey sentences like the one in (104) below.
(104) Everyu1 person who buys au2 book on amazon.com and has au3 credit card uses itu3 to pay
for itu2.
The most salient interpretation of sentence (104) is that, for every book (strong reading) that any credit-card owner buys
on amazon.com, there is some credit card (weak reading) that s/he uses to pay for the book. In particular, the credit card can
vary from book to book, e.g., I can use my MasterCard to buy set theory books and my Visa to buy detective novels, which
means that even weak indeﬁnites like au3 credit card can introduce non-singleton sets. For each buyer, the two sets
of objects, i.e., all the books purchased on amazon.com and some of the credit cards that the buyer has, are correlated and
the dependency between these sets – left implicit in the restrictor of the quantiﬁcation – is speciﬁed in the nuclear scope:
each book is correlated with the credit card that was used to pay for it. This paraphrase of the meaning of sentence (104) is
formalized in classical (static) ﬁrst-order logic as shown in (105) below.
(105) ∀x∀y(pers(x) ∧ bk(y) ∧ buy(x, y) ∧ ∃z(card(z) ∧ have(x, z)) → ∃z′(card(z′) ∧ have(x, z′) ∧ use_to_pay(x, z′, y)))
Allowing indeﬁnite articles to have a weak or a strong reading – as we did in (30) and (31) above – enables us to composi-
tionally account for suchmixed-reading donkey sentences becausewe locally specify for each indeﬁnitewhether it isweak or
strong. However, this account comes at the cost of postulating that indeﬁnite articles are ambiguous between/underspeciﬁed
for the presence vs. absence of amax operator.
We can improve on this analysis and better capture the idea that the full speciﬁcation is ultimately a pragmatic matter
by explicitly formalizing the fact that the new dref contributed by indeﬁnites can have only a contextually restricted set of
values. The revised translation for indeﬁnite articles is provided in (106) below: an indeﬁnite introduces the maximal set
of individuals u among a contextually provided set of individuals r that satisfy both the restrictor and the nuclear scope
property.
(106) aurλPet.λP′et. maxur(u(P(u); P′(u)))
The translation in (106) covers both weak and strong readings by (i) obligatorily building maximization into the mean-
ing of indeﬁnites, which delivers strong readings, and (ii) suitably restricting this maximization, which can deliver weak
readings depending on the contextually-supplied value for the domain-restricting dref r. The weak vs. strong variation is
now attributed to different ways of resolving the domain-restricting anaphora contributed by indeﬁnites – and not to an
ambiguity/lexical underspeciﬁcation.
Importantly,wedonot conﬂate indeﬁnites andRusselliandeﬁnites (oruniversal quantiﬁers).Deﬁnitesmaximizeonlyover
their restrictor property (the same thing happens with universal quantiﬁers), i.e., we extract the set of individuals satisfying
the restrictor property and check that this set is a singleton and that it satisﬁes the nuclear scope property. Indeﬁnites
maximize over both the restrictor and the nuclear scope property, i.e., we extract the set of individuals satisfying both of
them and we check that this set is non-empty. Thus, Russellian deﬁnites and maximal indeﬁnites differ with respect to: (i)
whether or not maximization ‘includes’ the nuclear scope property and (ii) whether or not the singleton requirement is part
of their meaning. One of the consequences of these differences is that, if there is no anaphora to the dref u introduced by the
indeﬁnite, the translation in (106) can be substituted salva veritatewith the simpler, non-max translation in (107) below.
(107) aurλPet.λP′et. [u | u  r]; u(P(u); P′(u))
If there is no salient restrictor dref r that can be anaphorically retrieved, we accommodate it. The accommodation
procedure has two extreme cases, which are by default available because they do not require any contextually salient,
non-trivial condition/property to constrain the restrictor dref r: either (i) we introduce a new dref r whose value is left
completely unconstrained (except for the trivially satisﬁed non-emptiness condition r /= ∅27), which results in the weak
reading for the indeﬁnite shown in (108) below, or (ii) we introduce a new dref r that stores all the individuals, which results
in the strong reading for the indeﬁnite shown in (109) below.
(108) weak donkey readings (accommodating an arbitrary restrictor):
aurλPet.λP′et. [r | r /= ∅]; maxur(u(P(u); P′(u))),
i.e., basically, λPet.λP
′
et. [u]; u(P(u); P′(u)), as in (30) above.
27 Equivalently, we can use the identity condition r = r. Identity is deﬁned as expected, i.e., u = u′ def= λIst . Iu /=# /= ∅ ∧ ∀is ∈ I(ui = u′i).
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(109) strong donkey readings (accommodating the set of all individuals):




u(u(P(u); P′(u))), as in (31) above.
In general, maximal accommodation seems to be preferred. Evidence for such a preference is provided by discourses
involving singular cross-sentential anaphora like (1) and (2) above or the Evans example There is a doctor in
London and he is Welsh. The (relativized) uniqueness effects in such examples are a consequence of the maxi-
mality of the indeﬁnite article in (109) above together with the singleton condition contributed by the singular anaphor.
The revised account ofweak/strong donkey readings in terms of domain restrictions on the indeﬁnite builds on the insight
and (informal) suggestions in Barker [4, pp. 254–258] (see also the discussion in Schein [71, pp. 342–345]) and can be taken
to accomplish the task – left there for future research – of formalizing the proposal and developing it into a more complete
account of weak/strong alternations.28
To capture the non-uniqueness of singular donkey anaphora (be it weak or strong), we need to neutralize the singleton
condition contributed by singular donkey pronouns. Just as in the analysis of telescoping discourses proposed above, we
obtain this by placing the singleton condition in the scope of a suitable distributivity operator. The distributivity operator is
contributedby the ‘main’ generalizeddeterminer inadonkeysentence– for example, in sentence (104) above, it is contributed
by the determiner everyu1 . Therefore, we need to (i) generalize distributivity operators to simultaneously target multiple
drefs and (ii) allow generalized determiners to freely introduce suchmultiple-dref distributors over their nuclear scope DRS.
The relevant deﬁnitions and translations are provided below, together with the compositionally obtained representation for
sentence (104) (simpliﬁed in various ways).
(110) distu1,...,un(D)
def= λIst .λJst .∀x1 . . .∀xn(Iu1=x1,...,un=xn /= ∅ ↔ Ju1=x1,...,un=xn /= ∅) ∧∀x1 . . .∀xn(Iu1=x1,...,un=xn /= ∅ → DIu1=x1,...,un=xn Ju1=x1,...,un=xn)
(111) u1,...,un(D)
def= λIst .λJst . (Iu1=# = Ju1=# ∧ . . . ∧ Iun=# = Jun=#) ∧ Iu1 /=#,...,un /=# /= ∅ ∧
distu1,...,un(D)Iu1 /=#,...,un /=#Ju1 /=#,...,un /=#
(112) 〈u1,...,un〉(D)
def= λIst .λJst . (Iu1=# = Ju1=# ∧ . . . ∧ Iun=# = Jun=#) ∧ (Iu1 /=#,...,un /=# = ∅ → I = J) ∧
(Iu1 /=#,...,un /=# /= ∅ → distu1,...,un(D)Iu1 /=#,...,un /=#Ju1 /=#,...,un /=#)
(113) detu,u′u λPet.λP′et. maxu(u(P(u))); [non-singleton{u}]; maxu′u(〈u′ ,u1,...,un〉(P′(u′))); [DET{u, u′}]
(114) everyu1  λPet.λP′et. maxu1(u1(P(u1))); [non-singleton{u1}]; u1,u2,u3(P′(u1))
(115) (104)maxu1(u1([pers{u1}]; maxu2([bk{u2}, buy{u1, u2}]); [u3 | card{u3}, have{u1, u3}])); [non-singleton{u1}];
u1,u2,u3([singleton{u3}, singleton{u2}, use_to_pay{u1, u3, u2}])
4.5. Anaphoric and uniqueness-implying deﬁnite descriptions
The availability of domain-restricting drefs also enables us to account for both anaphoric and unique uses of deﬁnite
descriptions with only one meaning. The two uses are exempliﬁed by discourse (2) above: the deﬁnite DP the banquet
in (2b) is not anaphoric to a previouslymentioned banquet and it implies uniqueness (the banquet is unique per convention),
while the deﬁnite DP the woman in (2c) is anaphoric – its antecedent is the indeﬁnite a woman in (2a). Similarly, the
discourse in (116) below (see [67, p. 290, (3)]) exempliﬁes both uses of deﬁnite descriptions.
(116) (Teacher, giving directions:) On the next page, you will find a puzzle. Find the clown (unique,
non-anaphoric) in the puzzle (anaphoric).
The meanings for thesg:u and thesg:u provided in (36) and (38) above captured the two uses of deﬁnite articles –
but this analysis of the deﬁnite article is not entirely satisfactory because: (i) it postulates a lexical ambiguity between two
meanings that, intuitively, are rather closely related and (ii) it predicts that Russellian, non-anaphoric deﬁnites are freely
available, while, in fact, their distribution is fairly restricted (basically, they occur only in bridging-like cases and in inherently
unique descriptions like superlatives, etc.). I will therefore follow the proposal in Farkas [23] (see, in particular, her notion of
determined reference) and assign a single meaning to deﬁnite articles, which incorporates features from both the anaphoric
(Heimian) and the uniqueness-based (Russellian) analysis of deﬁnite descriptions. That is, we require deﬁnite descriptions
to be unique in context, as shown in (117) below.29
(117) thesg:ur λPet.λP′et. r(P(r)); maxur(u(P(u))); [singleton{u}]; P′(u)
In contrast to indeﬁnites, the restrictor dref r of a deﬁnite cannot be accommodated (except in the special cases discussed
below) and has to be anaphorically resolved. Moreover, the restrictor property of the deﬁnite article has to be satisﬁed by
28 For a detailed comparison with alternative approaches to weak/strong donkey alternations (e.g., the one in Kanazawa [41]), see [12].
29 For a different way of thinking about the contextually-relativized uniqueness of deﬁnite descriptions, see [67] and [40].
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the anaphorically retrieved restrictor: underlining in (117) above indicates the presuppositional status of the DRS r(P(r)).
30
These two features of the meaning for deﬁnite articles (resistance to accommodation and presupposing the restrictor) are
the PCDRT reformulation of the anaphoric analysis of deﬁnites in Heim [36]. The maxu and singleton{u} combination in
(117) is just the PCDRT reformulation of the Russellian analysis.
Deﬁnites whose restrictor property is (based on) an anaphoric relational noun – e.g.,banquetu′λve. [banquet{v, u′}]
in discourse (2) above is anaphoric to u′-conventions – allow for the accommodation of the restrictor dref r because the
anaphoricity of the deﬁnite article is vicariously satisﬁed by the anaphoricity of the relational noun. The translation of such
bridging deﬁnites – before the restrictor dref r is accommodated – is provided in (118) below.
(118) thesg:ur banquetu′λPet. [banquet{r, u′}]; maxur([banquet{u, u′}]); [singleton{u}]; P(u)
When the accommodation of the domain-restricting dref r on deﬁnites is allowed, it can by default proceed in two ways
(just as in the case of indeﬁnites).
One option is to just introduce the dref r and make sure it satisﬁes the presupposition of the deﬁnite, i.e., its restrictor
property, as shown in (120) below. This gives us the basic analysis of weak deﬁnites in Rawlins [61] (see also [3,5,60]). Weak
deﬁnites, like the cube in (119) below (based on Rawlins [61, p. 341, (13)]), are neither unique nor anaphoric: a cube has
multiple sides and no particular side ismentioned in the discourse that precedes theweak deﬁnite. Hence, neither of the two
most prominent analyses of deﬁnite descriptions (the uniqueness-based, Russellian one and the anaphoric, Heimian one) can
account for them. Their PCDRT analysis follows from two independently motivated components: the meaning for deﬁnite
articles in (117) above and the accommodation procedure in (108) above, needed to account for weak donkey readings.
(119) a. In the center of the room is au
′
stone cube.
b. Engraved on theur sideu′ is some lettering.
(120) weak deﬁnites – existence & non-uniqueness (accommodating an arbitrary restrictor):
thesg:ur sideu′λPet. [r | side{r, u′}]; maxur([side{u, u′}]); [singleton{u}]; P(u),
i.e., basically: λPet. [u | side{u, u′}]; [singleton{u}]; P(u)
The other option for the accommodation of the restrictor dref – parallel to the one in (109) above, which delivers strong
donkey readings – is to store in r the maximal set of individuals that satisﬁes the presupposition of the deﬁnite, as shown in
(121) below. This gives us genuinemaximality, which, togetherwith the singleton condition contributed by singular number
morphology, gives us theRussellianmeaning for deﬁnite articles. Just as in the case of indeﬁnites, there is a general preference
for maximal accommodation, which yields the uniqueness implications commonly associated with deﬁnite descriptions.
(121) Russellian deﬁnites – existence & uniqueness (accommodating the set of all individuals):
thesg:ur banquetu′λPet.maxr([banquet{r, u′}]); maxur([banquet{u, u′}]); [singleton{u}]; P(u),
i.e., basically: λPet. max
u([banquet{u, u′}]); [singleton{u}]; P(u)
4.6. Same/different and quantiﬁer scope
The fact that we can represent structured quantiﬁer domains, retrieve them anaphorically, place constraints on them in a
syntactically non-local manner and relate various quantiﬁer domains to one another enables us to analyze adjectival items
like same and different and their interactions with quantiﬁer scope in a way that captures the intuition (going back
at least to Dowty [17]; see also [8]) that same and different are pronoun-like items and their semantic behavior is a
consequence of their pronominal nature.
Consider the sentences in (122) and (123) below. Intuitively, they have two readings (as observed in Carlson [14]; see also
[2,6] for recent discussions): (i) a deictic reading, according to which every student chose a poet that is the same as/different
from a contextually salient poet (e.g., the poet that the teacher chose), and (ii) an internal one, according to which every
student chose a poet and, for any two students, the poets they chose are the same individual/two distinct individuals.
(122) Everyu student chose thesg:u′r′ samer′÷u poet.
(123) Everyu student chose au
′r′ differentr′÷u poet.
30 Generalized determiners that anaphorically retrieve their restrictor dref r can also be taken to presuppose that r satisﬁes their restrictor property, as
shown in (i) below. This hypothesis, together with the generally accepted assumption that presuppositions triggered in the nuclear scope of a quantiﬁcation
have to be satisﬁed relative to the restrictor of that quantiﬁcation, enables us to derive the observation in Beaver and Zeevat [7] that the presupposition
triggered by the possessivehisu king in discourse (ii) below (fromBeaver and Zeevat [7]) has to be satisﬁed relative to the dref r restricting the quantiﬁer
everyur man, thereby yielding the interpretation: every one of the seventeen men has a king and they all love their respective king.
(i) detur,u′uλPet.λP′et. r(P(r));maxur(u(P(u))); [non-singleton{u}];maxu′u(〈u′〉(P′(u′))); [DET{u, u′}]
(ii) a. There are seventeenr men in the room.
b. Every manur loves hisu king.
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I will conﬁnemyself to analyzing the internal reading of sentences (122) and (123), leaving the generalization of this basic
account for another occasion.31 The proposal is that same and different contribute presuppositional constraints on
the domain restrictor of their deﬁnite/indeﬁnite DP – and these constraints are anaphoric to the dref previously introduced
by a suitable (distributive) quantiﬁer.
Forexample, in (122)and(123)above, theadjectivessame anddifferent require thedref r′ restricting their respective
DPs to be related in a particular way to the quantiﬁer domain u introduced by everyu: samer′÷u requires r′ to store the
same individual relative to all u-individuals, while diffr′÷u requires r′ to store different individuals relative to different
u-individuals – as shown in (124) and (125) below (underlining indicates presuppositional status).
The representations for sentences (122) and (123) obtained after presupposition resolution32 are provided in (126) and
(127) below. In both cases, the presuppositional conditions introduced by the adjectives same and different are inter-
preted as ‘high’ as possible, i.e., immediately after the restrictor of the quantiﬁer that introduces the dref u. The restrictor dref
r′ is introduced/accommodated at the same location, in parallel to the way restrictor drefs are introduced/accommodated
for weak indeﬁnites and bridging weak deﬁnites (see (108) and (120) above). The resulting representation for the quantiﬁer
everyu student is reminiscent of the ‘discontinuous quantiﬁcation’ approach in Stump [78] and Keenan [43] –without
actually postulating the existence of discontinuous quantiﬁers.
(124) samer′÷u
def= λIst . Ir′ /=# ⊆ Iu /=# ∧ ∀xe ∈ uIu /=#(Iu=x,r′ /=# /= ∅) ∧ ∀is ∈ Ir′ /=#∀i′s ∈ Ir′ /=#(r′i = r′i′)
(125) diffr′÷u
def= λIst . Ir′ /=# ⊆ Iu /=# ∧ ∀xe ∈ uIu /=#(Iu=x,r′ /=# /= ∅) ∧ ∀is ∈ Ir′ /=#∀i′s ∈ Ir′ /=#(ui /= ui′ → r′i /= r′i′)
(126) maxu([stud{u}]); [r′ | samer′÷u]; [non-singleton{u}]; u(maxu′r′([poet{u′}]); [singleton{u′}]; [choose{u, u′}])
(127) maxu([stud{u}]); [r′ | diffr′÷u]; [non-singleton{u}]; u(maxu′r′([poet{u′}]; [choose{u, u′}]))
The analysis outlined here enables us to give an explanation for two facts noticed in Barker [6, Section 5.7]: (i) we
have to use the deﬁnite article with same – the indeﬁnite DP a same poet is not acceptable; (ii) deﬁnite descriptions
involvingsame do not trigger existence presuppositions, unlike typical deﬁnite descriptions likethe Romanian poet
– compare, for example, (128) and (129) below.
(128) Did every student choose the same poet?
(129) Did every student choose the Romanian poet?
The present anaphoric analysis of same captures both generalizations.
We use the deﬁnite article because the presupposition contributed by same guarantees uniqueness (or determined
reference, to use the terminology of Farkas [23]) and, ceteris paribus, we will use the strongest possible article (note that, in
a generalized sense of entailment, the deﬁnite article entails/is stronger than the indeﬁnite one). This is formally captured
by the close similarity between the same condition deﬁned in (124) and the singleton condition deﬁned in (32) above.
We can also account for the fact that no existence presuppositions are associated with internal readings of same – in
contrast todeictic readings,wheredeﬁnitesareassociatedwithexistencepresuppositions (this generalization,notmentioned
in [6], complements the generalization in (ii) above).
The lackofexistencepresuppositionswith internal readings isdue to therestrictordref r′ being introduced/accommodated
at the quantiﬁcation-internal site where the presupposition contributed by same is resolved: the correlation between the
non-projection of the existence presupposition and the internal resolution of the same presupposition follows from the fact
that both of them target the same dref r′ and the internal reading of same ‘anchors’ the domain restrictor r′ to the dref u
introducedby thequantiﬁerevery . In the caseof adeictic reading, the samepresupposition targets apreviously introduced,
contextually salient dref – hence, the restrictor dref r′ and its associated existence presupposition will also project out of the
sentence.
5. A parallel account of modal subordination
This section brieﬂy indicates how PCDRT can be extended to give a compositional account of modal subordination
discourses, a typical example of which is provided in (130) below (based on examples in Roberts [63,64]).
(130) a. Au wolf might come in.
b. Itu would attack Harvey first.
Under its most salient interpretation, (130) asserts that, for all the speaker knows, it is possible that a wolf comes in.
Moreover, in any such epistemic possibility, thewolf attacksHarveyﬁrst. Discourse (130) is parallel to discourse (2) above: the
interactionbetween the indeﬁniteau wolf and themodalmightononehandand the singular pronounitu and themodal
would on the other hand is parallel to the interaction between au woman-every convention and sheu-always.
31 The full account will have to capture not only deictic readings, but also the interactions between same/different and distributive/collective
predications (see [14]), their NP-internal uses (see [6]), their interaction with generalized conjunction/disjunction, etc.
32 I assume a presupposition resolution procedure of the kind proposed in van der Sandt [69].
470 A. Brasoveanu / Information and Computation 208 (2010) 450–473
The addition of another basic type w for possible worlds together with drefs for possible worlds p, p′, etc. of type sw is
almost everything that is needed to account for the interpretation of discourse (130). In the resulting Intensional PCDRT
(IP-CDRT) system, the drefs p, p′, etc. store sets of possible worlds, i.e., propositions, relative to a plural info state, e.g., pI def=
{pswis : is ∈ Ist}, i.e., pI is the image of the set of assignments I under the function p.
The basic IP-CDRT system is parallel to the PCDRT system introduced in the previous sections, so I provide only some
of the relevant deﬁnitions. Note that the deﬁnition of structured inclusion for sets of worlds in (133) below employs a
dummy/exception world #w
33 that makes every lexical relation false, just as the dummy/exception individual #e does.
(131) Rp{u1, . . . , un} def= λIst . Ip /=#,u1 /=#,...,un /=# /= ∅ ∧ ∀is ∈ Ip /=#,u1 /=#,...,un /=#(Rpi(u1i, . . . , uni))34
(132) [p] def= λIst .λJst . ∀is ∈ I(∃js ∈ J(i[p]j)) ∧ ∀js ∈ J(∃is ∈ I(i[p]j))
(133) p′  p def= λIst . (p′p)I ∧ ∀is ∈ I(pi ∈ p′Ip′ /=# → pi = p′i),
where p′p def= λIst . ∀is ∈ I(p′i = pi ∨ p′i = #).
In an intensional Fregean/Montagovian framework, the compositional aspect of interpretation is largely determined by
the types for the extensions of the ‘saturated’ expressions, i.e., names and sentences, plus the type that enables us to build
intensions out of these extensions. Let us abbreviate them as e, t and s respectively. We preserve the dynamic types that
PCDRT assigns to the ‘meta-types’ e and t, i.e., t
def= (st)((st)t) and e def= se. Predictably, IP-CDRT uses possible-world drefs to
build intensions, i.e., s
def= sw.
Just as generalizeddeterminers in PCDRT relate dynamic properties P, P′, etc. of type et (see (29) above),modal verbs relate
dynamic propositions p, p′, etc. of type st, as shown in (134) below (themeaning for modal quantiﬁers can be further reﬁned
along the lines suggested for individual-level quantiﬁcation in Section 4 above). Moreover, just as a pronoun anaphorically
retrieves an individual dref andmakes sure that a dynamic property holds of that dref (e.g.,she in (34) above), the indicative
mood anaphorically retrieves p*,which is the designateddref for the actualworld, andmakes sure that a dynamic proposition
holds of p*, as shown in (135) below. Finally, just as the quantiﬁer always in (2b) is anaphoric to the nuclear scope set
introduced by every convention in (2a), the modal quantiﬁer would in (130b) is anaphoric to the nuclear scope set
introduced by might in (130a). The general format for the translation of anaphoric modal quantiﬁers is provided in (136)
below (cf. the translation of anaphoric determiners in (57) above);μ andω are drefs for amodal base and an ordering source
respectively, with contextually-supplied values. For a detailed presentation of IP-CDRT, see [11]; for an alternative way of
extending [9] with modal quantiﬁcation to account for examples like (130) above, see [68].
(134) ifp + modalμ,ωp






The IP-CDRT account successfully generalizes tomore complex interactions betweenmodal and individual-level anaphora
exhibited by naturally occurring discourses like (137) below (Thomas Aquinas, attributed).
(137) a. [A] man cannot live without joy.
b. Therefore, when he is deprived of true spiritual joys, it is necessary that he
become addicted to carnal pleasures.
We are interested in the entailment relation established by therefore between the modal premise in (137a) and the
modal conclusion in (137b). To capture this, we need to account for several interrelated phenomena.
First, we need a meaning for the particle therefore that relates the content of the premise (137a) and the content
of the conclusion (137b) and requires the latter to be entailed by the former. I take the content of a sentence to be truth-
conditional in nature, i.e., the set of possible worlds in which the sentence is true, and entailment to be content inclusion,
i.e., (137a) entails (137b) iff for any world w, if (137a) is true in w, so is (137b).
Second, we want to capture the meanings of (137a) and (137b), i.e., their context-change potentials, which encode both
content (truth-conditions) and anaphoric potential. Thus, on one hand, we are interested in the contents of (137a) and
(137b). They are both modal quantiﬁcations: (137a) involves a circumstantial modal base (to use the terminology in Kratzer
[44]) and says that, in view of the circumstances, i.e., given that God created man in a particular way, as long as a man is
alive, he must ﬁnd some thing or other pleasurable; (137b) involves the same modal base and elaborates on the preceding
modal quantiﬁcation – in view of the circumstances, if a man is alive and has no spiritual pleasure, he must have a carnal
pleasure. Note that we need tomake the contents of (137a) and (137b) accessible in discourse so that the entailment particle
33 We can take the dummy world #w to be the world where no individual whatsoever exists, hence all the lexical relations are false because a relation
between certain individuals obtains at a particular world w only if those individuals exist in w.
34 The deﬁnition of atomic conditions in (131) assumes static lexical relations Rw(x1, . . . , xn) of the expected intensional type e
n(wt), where enτ (for any
type τ ) is deﬁned as: e0τ
def= τ and em+1τ def= e(emτ). The world argument is represented as a subscript to improve readability – the ‘ofﬁcial’ representation
of static intensional relations has the (expected) form R(w, x1, . . . , xn).
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therefore can relate them. On the other hand, we are interested in the anaphoric potential of (137a) and (137b), i.e., in
the anaphoric connections between them. These connections are explicitly represented in discourse (138) below, which is
intuitively equivalent to (137) albeit more awkwardly phrased.
(138) a. (content q:) Ifp au1 man is alive, heu1 mustp find something pleasurable/heu1 mustp
have a pleasure.
b. Thereforeq,q′ (content q′:) ifpp
′
heu1 doesn’t have any spiritual pleasure, heu1 mustp′
have a carnal pleasure.
Discourse (137/138) is analyzed as a network of structured anaphoric connections and the meaning (and validity) of the
Aquinas argument emerges as a consequence of the intertwined individual-level and modal anaphora.
In particular, the conditional in (138b) is modally subordinated to the antecedent of the conditional in (138a), i.e., (138b)
is interpreted as: if a man is alive and he does not have any spiritual pleasure, he must have a carnal pleasure. That is, we
have an instance of multiply embedded modal subordination, since the two modalized conditionals are embedded under
the modal quantiﬁcation contributed by therefore.
Unlikemany other approaches tomodal subordination, IP-CDRT does not need any additional stipulations to capture this,
i.e., (i) to allow anaphoric information to be non-locally available across multiple levels of quantiﬁcational embedding and
(ii) to extract and cross-sententially relate the propositional contents of entire modal quantiﬁcations. Such contents are not
available in the systems of van Rooy [68] or Stone [77], for example.
IP-CDRTalsoenableus tocapturemodal subordinationacrossattitude reports–see [68] forananalysisof thisphenomenon
in a dynamic system that also builds on van den Berg [9] – and modal subordination across de se attitude reports, where
we need to pass information about centered worlds across sentential boundaries, exempliﬁed in (139) (from Heim [37]) and
(140), respectively.
(139) Linus thinksp that he willp catch au fish and he hopespp
′
I willp′ grill itu tonight.
(140) Linus believesp,uself that hisuself pants arep on fire and he hopesp,uself
p′ ,uself ′ that heuself ′ willp′
find a fire extinguisher some time soon.
The centeredworlds needed for de se reports are pairs/dependencies of the form (w, xself ), wherew is an attitude-internal
world (a belief world, a hope world, etc.) and xself , the center of world w, is the individual that the attitude holder takes
herself to be in w. Centered worlds are represented by means of a modal dref p and an individual dref uself and the rows in
a plural info state store the dependencies between worlds and their centers. Note that IP-CDRT allows the same world to be
associated with multiple centers – this is needed to account for the two-god scenario in Lewis [50] (among other things).
Finally, given that IP-CDRT integrates in a rather even-handed way Montagovian and plural dynamic semantics, it is
straightforward to incorporate the static analysis of questions in Groenendijk and Stokhof [33] and provide an account of
modal subordination in questions – a phenomenon ﬁrst observed and analyzed in van Rooy [68]. The discourses below
exemplifying this phenomenon are (based on examples) from van Rooy [68].
(141) Whou went to the party and what did theyu bring as a present?
(142) Q: Whou went to the party?
A: I don’t know, but Linus wasn’t one of themu.
(143) Whichu guest brought whichu
′
present and where did theyu buy themu′?
This concludes our brief survey of IP-CDRT. It is hopefully clear that this system enables us to systematically capture the
anaphoric and quantiﬁcational parallels between the individual andmodal domains – in particular, that the IP-CDRT analyses
of modal and quantiﬁcational subordination are point-for-point parallel.
6. Comparison with previous approaches
PCDRT differs from previous dynamic approaches in three respects. The ﬁrst difference is conceptual: building on and
modifying [9], PCDRT captures the idea that reference to structure is as important as reference to value and that the two
should be treated in parallel. This is primarily encoded in the deﬁnition of new dref introduction in (5) above, which differs
from the corresponding deﬁnitions in van den Berg [9], Krifka [47], van Rooy [68] and Nouwen [54] (among others) with
respect to the treatment of discourse reference to structure (see, for example, Brasoveanu [11] for a comparison between the
deﬁnitions of random assignment in van den Berg [9] and PCDRT).
Capturing reference to structure as discourse reference to structure, i.e., by means of plural information states rather
than by means of (drefs for) choice and/or Skolem functions, is preferable because the arity of such functions – and which
particular functions are needed – is determined by the discourse context and should, therefore, be encoded in the database
that stores discourse information, i.e., the information state, and not in the representation of a lexical item (be it the anaphor
and/or its antecedent).
Consider for example the discourse in (144) below. To capture the fact that sentence (144b) elaborates on the dependency
between three sets of individuals (boys, gifts and girls) introduced in sentence (144a), Skolem-function based approaches
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would need functions of a greater arity than the ones needed to account for discourse (2), for example, and the functions
themselves would just repeatedly encode – in the meaning of certain lexical items – the dependency incrementally con-
structed in discourse. This being said, various assumptions and proposals are shared by PCDRT and the Skolem-function
based approach in Steedman [76], which deserves a more detailed discussion than what is possible here.
(144) (The Christmas party organized by my son’s school was kind of funny:)
a. Everyu boy bought au
′
red pencil for everyu
′′
girl in hisu class.
b. Invariably, theu′′ girl politely thanked theu boy for theu′ gift and gave itu′ back to himu.
The second difference is empirical: the motivation for plural information states is provided by several distinct kinds of
phenomena, including singular intra- and cross-sentential individual-level anaphora andmodal anaphora and subordination,
in contrast to the previous literature (e.g., van den Berg [9], Krifka [47] and Nouwen [54]), which relies mostly on plural
individual-level anaphora. Consequently, the empirical coverage of (Intensional) PCDRT is correspondingly broader and the
dynamic import of various items, e.g., number morphology, is systematically investigated and compositionally encoded.
Finally, from a formal point of view, PCDRT accomplishes two non-trivial goals for the ﬁrst time. On one hand, it is not
obvious how to recast van den Berg’s Dynamic Plural Logic in classical type logic, given that the former logic is partial and
conﬂates discourse-level plurality (i.e., the use of plural information states) and domain-level plurality (i.e., non-atomic
individuals).35
On the other hand, Intensional PCDRT – which builds on and uniﬁes Lewis [48]/Kratzer [44], Muskens [52], van den
Berg [9] and Stone [77] – is, to my knowledge, the ﬁrst dynamic framework that systematically and explicitly captures the
anaphoric and quantiﬁcational parallels between the individual and modal domains while, at the same time, keeping the
underlying logic classical and preserving the Montagovian approach to compositionality – but see van Rooy [68], Stone [77]
and Bittner [10] for three dynamic systems closely related to Intensional PCDRT and designed with the same general goals
in mind.
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